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I. INTRODUCTION 
Producers, lenders, lawyers, and courts continue to grapple with 
problems connected with agriculture credit.  This Article will examine a 
few of the unique issues agricultural collateral transactions raise with 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),1 as well as some 
interesting problems dealing with purchasers of farm products subject to 
a security interest, and farm products sold by someone other than the 
rightful owner of the goods. 
In 1962, the UCC included Article 9 which governs conflicts 
concerning security interests in personal property.  Since 1962, Article 9 
has been changed significantly twice.  Substantial amendments were 
made in 1972, and in 1999, Article 9 was completely revised.  The 1999 
version is often called “Revised 9” and is the product of years of study 
and drafting by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws (NCCUSL)2 and the American Law Institute (ALI).3  The 
                                                     
 1. Unless otherwise indicated all citations in this paper are to the 2009 version of the UCC 
found in SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES (Carol L. Chomsky et al. eds., West 2009).  The 
Kansas version of Article 9 is found in sections 84-9-101 to 700 of the 1984 Kansas Statutes and the 
2008 Supplement. 
 2. See generally Uniform Law Commission, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ (last visited Mar. 
3, 2010).  The NCCUSL is an organization of state governments started in 1892 whose purpose is to 
draft and secure enactment of uniform state laws on a wide variety of subjects.  The NCCUSL 
became interested in developing a single comprehensive commercial code covering all aspects of 
commercial transactions (contract, payment, and credit).  It drafts two types of proposed legislation: 
(1) uniform acts which apply to legal problems common to all states, where uniformity of treatment 
is very important; and (2) model acts which involve problems common to all states, but where 
uniformity is not important. 
Members who serve without compensation are called commissioners and come from all fifty 
states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.  Most are practicing 
lawyers, but some are judges and law professors.  Each state normally sends four people.  Each 
state’s delegation, however, has only one vote on whether proposed acts should be approved by the 
NCCUSL.  Each commissioner must try to persuade his or her state legislature to adopt its proposals. 
An established process exists for determining when the NCCUSL will get involved.  Initially, a 
study committee of commissioners will be formed.  This function is performed by the Permanent 
Editorial Board (PEB) when an area covered by the UCC is involved.  Suggestions for changes can 
come from the PEB, individual commissioners, the ALI or its members, and third parties such as the 
American Bar Association (ABA).  Once the Executive Committee of the NCCUSL and the ALI 
decide to proceed, a drafting committee is formed.  This committee will have a reporter who is a 
legal expert in the subject matter of the proposed statute.  The product of the drafting committee is 
presented and must be approved by the membership of the NCCUSL and also by the ALI 
membership when the UCC is involved.  For a general discussion of the process, see infra text of 
note 4. 
 3. The ALI has about 2500 members (professors, judges, and practicing lawyers) who are 
elected for life.  It is funded by gifts, dues, receipts from the sale of publications, and returns on 
investments.  The NCCUSL conceived the idea of a UCC and sought the help of the ALI who has a 
wider membership, greater prestige, and more financial support.  The ALI has formulated a 
comprehensive series of restatements of common law.  The ALI has been involved with codification 
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revision process followed in revising Article 9 is not without 
controversy.4  However, somewhat surprisingly, all states quickly 
adopted some version of Revised Article 9.5  Article 9 has a language all 
its own6 and is basically divided into five parts: scope,7 attachment,8 
perfection,9 priorities,10 and default.11  This Article will be organized 
around the first four parts. 
                                                                                                                       
projects, model acts, and studies. 
 4. Questions have been raised about the process followed by the NCCUSL and the ALI in 
revising Article 9.  Moreover, only time will tell whether Revised 9 will produce results that justify 
the considerable resources devoted to its creation and the costs connected with implementing 
Revised 9.  Previous drafts of Revised 9 may be found on the Internet at University of Pennsylvania 
Law School, http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ulc.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
Both NCCUSL and ALI work on revisions and both approve changes, but the NCCUSL alone 
directs the effort to get states to adopt the new version of the UCC.  The ALI revision process 
typically starts with a study committee and a group of advisors.  If changes are needed, a drafting 
committee is appointed.  The drafting committee will contain academics, representatives of the 
various industries affected and consumer advocates.  An attempt is made to develop a code that has 
broad appeal so that special interest groups will not derail states from adopting it.  It must also be 
noted that currently the ABA plays an important role in the development process.  For a thorough 
discussion of the revision process of Article 9 of the UCC, see Marianne B. Culhane, The UCC 
Revision Process: Legislation You Should See in the Making, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29 (1992). 
Some have argued that the process is a closed society dominated by pro-business advocates and 
is too rigid in its approach to rethinking uniform acts.  See Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, 
Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 
MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993); Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some 
Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 743 (1993); Alan 
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 
(1995). 
 5. See 1998 UCC Article 9 Revision, in 1 SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE 4991 (Commerce 
Clearing House, Inc., 2002) (listing dates of states’ adoption of the 1998 Article 9 text). 
 6. Article 9’s language is unique and defines terms in a unique way.  The person granting 
credit may become a “secured party” by contracting for a “security interest” in property called 
“collateral” to secure an obligation of the “debtor.”  See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(72) (defining “secured 
party”); § 9-102(a)(12) (defining “collateral”); § 9-102(a)(28) (defining “debtor”).  The contract is a 
“security agreement.”  § 9-102(a)(73).  “Security interest” is defined as “an interest in personal 
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation.”  § 1-201(35). 
 7. § 9-109. 
 8. §§ 9-201 to 210. 
 9. Perfection is designed to give public notice of a security interest.  §§ 9-308 to 316, 9-502 
cmt. 2.  In general, depending on the type of collateral, perfection can occur in five different ways: 
(1) secured party files a financing statement in a public office, (2) secured party takes possession of 
the collateral, (3) secured party obtains control, (4) the security interest is noted on the certificate of 
title, and (5) perfection can occur automatically upon attachment of the security interest under § 9-
203(b).  §§ 9-310 to 316. 
 10. See §§ 9-317 to 339. 
 11. §§ 9-601 to 624. 
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II. SCOPE 
A. In General 
When a debtor defaults on its obligation to a creditor, the question 
becomes how the creditor will collect on its debt.  This turns on whether 
the creditor is secured or unsecured.  Secured, in general, means that the 
creditor has an enforceable lien on specific property of the debtor.  Liens 
can exist in personal property as well as in real property.  In general, a 
lien on specific property may be obtained in three ways: a judicial lien,12 
a statutory lien,13 or a consensual lien.  Article 9 basically covers only 
consensual liens.  In other words, those transactions where a debtor by 
agreement grants to a creditor an enforceable interest in specific property 
to secure debtor’s obligation to pay or perform are covered. 
What does it mean to say that a conflict or transaction is covered by 
Article 9?  Unless otherwise provided, it means that all of the attachment, 
perfection, priority, default and enforcement rules apply.  Whether 
Article 9 applies is important when parties are considering some sort of 
credit transaction and when an existing credit transaction has difficulties. 
                                                     
 12. A judicial lien is normally created through the litigation process when the creditor seeks a 
money judgment on an unpaid debt.  Upon obtaining a judgment, the creditor enforces the judgment 
by properly taking control of the property and converting it to cash.  State enforcement mechanisms 
and exemptions differ.  Once the creditor has taken control of personal property, the creditor is a lien 
creditor for purposes of Article 9.  U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(52)(A) (2009). 
 13. Statutory liens are not created by agreement and do not depend upon judicial action.  It is a 
“status lien”—arising by operation of law because of a particular creditor’s status.  The statutory lien 
gives a creditor an enforceable interest in specific goods to assure payment for goods, services, land, 
labor, or whatever was provided by the person entitled to the lien.  Of course the property normally 
has to be converted to cash.  Statutory lien holders are, in effect, given the rights of a secured 
creditor even though they did not bargain for security.  Statutory liens are either possessory or 
nonpossessory.  If a lien is possessory, the creditor claiming the lien must have possession of the 
property claimed to be subject to the lien. 
Traditionally, non-consensual liens created in personal property by statute have not been 
covered by Article 9.  However, the uniform version of Article 9 does cover two statutory liens.  One 
is a priority conflict between a secured creditor and the holder of a possessory statutory lien.  See 
U.C.C. § 9-333 (2009).  The other is a statutory agriculture lien.  See §§ 9-102 (a)(5), 9-109 (a)(2). 
One of the most significant revisions of Article 9 in 2001 concerns nonpossessory liens in 
agricultural products.  This change has been enacted in every state other than Kansas.  For the first 
time, a nonpossessory statutory lien defined as an “agriculture lien” is subject to Article 9’s 
perfection, priority, and enforcement rules.  Id.  A number of law review articles examine 
agricultural financing and liens under Revised 9.  See, e.g., Keith G. Meyer, Kansas’s Unique 
Treatment of Agricultural Liens, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 1141 (2005) [hereinafter Meyer, Unique 
Treatment] and articles cited therein.  For a general statement as to the scope changes in Revised 9, 
see Keith G. Meyer, A Primer on Purchase Money Security Interests Under Revised Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 143, 145–47 (2001) [hereinafter Meyer, Purchase 
Money Security Interest]. 
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Scope or coverage of Article 9 is controlled by UCC section 9-109, 
which states in part: 
(a) [General scope of article.]  Except as otherwise provided in 
subsections (c) and (d), this article applies to: 
 (1) a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security 
interest in personal property or fixtures by contract; 
 (2) an agricultural lien; 
 (3) a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or 
promissory notes; 
 (4) a consignment; 
 (5) a security interest arising under Section 2-401, 2-505, 2-711(3), 
or 2A-508(5), as provided in Section 9-110; and 
 (6) a security interest arising under Section 4-210 or 5-118. 
(b) [Security interest in secured obligation.]  The application of this 
article to a security interest in a secured obligation is not affected by the 
fact that the obligation is itself secured by a transaction or interest to 
which this article does not apply.14 
UCC sections 9-109(c) and (d) set forth a number of transactions that are 
not covered by Article 9.15  Some of these include United States statutes, 
federal treaties, or other state statutes that expressly govern security 
interests in personal property.  Article 9 also does not cover most 
involuntary liens, landlord liens, and leases of real estate.16  A few scope 
issues of current interest are considered here. 
A 2008 Kansas bankruptcy case, In re Wild West World L.L.C., is in 
effect a scope case.17  Here an unpaid seller sold and delivered a good to 
a buyer.18  Seller and buyer expressly agreed that seller’s title would not 
pass to buyer until seller was paid in full.19  Buyer, before paying seller,  
 
                                                     
 14. U.C.C. § 9-109 (2009). 
 15. § 9-109(c)–(d). 
 16. Id.  Agriculture liens are the exception.  §9-102(a)(5); see also supra note 13 and 
accompanying text. 
 17. Nos. 07-11620, 07-1193, 2008 WL 4642266 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008). 
 18. Id. at *2. 
 19. Id. at *1. 
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granted creditor a security interest in the good that was purchased on 
credit.20 
The issue was whether buyer had sufficient rights in the good to 
create a security interest in the good.21  UCC section 2-401(1) limits any 
reservation or retention of title in goods shipped or delivered to the 
retention of a security interest.  Section 9-109(a)(5), as set out above, 
provides that Article 9 applies to a security interest arising under section 
2-401.22  The court held that seller’s voluntary surrender of possession 
gave buyer sufficient rights in the good to grant a security interest.23  
Attachment occurred here because an adequate security agreement 
existed, value was given and the debtor (here buyer) had sufficient rights 
in the good to create a security interest.24  Credit seller must comply with 
Article 9 to be protected against third parties including buyer’s other 
creditors or a trustee in bankruptcy.  While seller may have had a 
security interest, it did not perfect.  Thus, seller loses to a perfected 
secured creditor.  Accordingly, the unpaid credit seller must determine 
whether any other creditor of buyer has filed a financing statement 
covering the good.  If none exists, seller will file and have priority under 
the first-to-file rule.25  What if a filed financing statement exists?  Seller 
can require cash, seek a subordination from the secured creditor who has  
 
                                                     
 20. Id. at **1–2. 
 21. Id. at *2. 
 22. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-202 (2009) (providing that, in general, title or ownership is irrelevant). 
 23. In re Wild West World, 2008 WL 4642266, at *4. 
 24. § 9-203(a)–(b); cf. § 1-201(b)(35).  See generally In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th 
Cir. 1976).  In this case, debtor’s conditional purchase and taking possession of the good established 
rights for purposes of attachment.  Id. at 1241.  Since 2001, the so-called “rights” requirement of 
attachment can be satisfied under section 9-203(b)(2) if the debtor has “the power to transfer rights 
in the collateral to a secured party.”  Debtor (buyer) could have obtained this power under UCC 
section 2-403(1)(b) if buyer purchased the good with a bad check.  Buyer has voidable title and the 
power to transfer good title to a good-faith purchaser.  See U.C.C. §§ 9-203 cmt. 6; 2-403(1)(b); 1-
201(29)–(30).  See also the definition of good faith in sections 1-201(20), 2-103(1)(b), 9-102(a)(43), 
and 9-101 cmt. 4.k.  See, e.g., In re Samuels, 526 F.2d at 1238; In re McLouth Steel Corp., 22 B.R. 
722 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982); In re W. Farmers Ass’n, 6 B.R. 432 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1980); 
Swets Motor Sales, Inc. v. Pruisner, 236 N.W.2d 299 (Iowa 1975). 
While apparently the issue of seller’s ability to reclaim the goods for nonpayment did not arise 
in In re Wild West World, remember that unpaid sellers have limited rights of reclamation under 11 
U.S.C. § 546(c).  Also, UCC section 2-702(2) provides that an unpaid credit seller has the right to 
reclaim goods upon the discovery of a buyer’s insolvency.  However, under section 2-702(3) the 
right to reclaim is not effective against a buyer in the ordinary course or other good-faith purchasers.  
A secured party is treated as a good-faith purchaser.  See §§ 1-201(29)–(30); 9-203 cmt. 6; In re 
Samuels, 526 F.2d at 1242; cf. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35). 
 25. See U.C.C. § 9-322(a).  But seller must remember that the first-to-file rule is subject to a 
few exceptions.  The biggest being the purchase money security interest super priority under section 
9-324. 
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filed, or determine if the purchase-money exception to the first-to-file 
rule can be satisfied.26 
Another scope issue that has been frequently litigated is whether a 
document entitled a “lease” is in fact a security agreement.27  The impact 
of being a secured transaction rather than a lease is that the rules of 
Article 9 apply, including the requirement of perfection.  These 
requirements present no difficult obstacles.28  It also means that, if a 
bankruptcy petition is filed and the transaction is determined to be a 
secured transaction, 11 U.S.C. § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code dealing 
with executory contracts does not apply. 
UCC section 1-203 which is entitled “Lease Distinguished From 
Security Interest” is the key section.  In the 2009 case, In re Gateway 
Ethanol, L.L.C., the court was confronted with a lease involving an 
ethanol plant in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.29  The basic issue here is 
whether a document denoted as a lease but containing an option to 
purchase for a specific price was a true lease or a security agreement 
                                                     
 26. See U.C.C. §§ 9-103, 9-322(f), and 9-324.  See generally Meyer, Purchase Money Security 
Interest, supra note 13, at 164–91. 
If the collateral is equipment in the hands of the buyer, the seller has a relatively easy task to 
take priority over a previously filed secured creditor.  If the good is inventory in the hands of the 
buyer, the seller has an impossible challenge to comply with UCC section 9-324(b). 
The latter situation can arise in the sale of farm products.  Farmer delivers and sells grain to an 
elevator and receives a bad check from the elevator.  A lender has a perfected security interest in the 
inventory of the elevator, which consists of company-owned grain.  Does the elevator have sufficient 
rights in the collateral so that the lender’s security interest will attach to the grain purchased with a 
bad check?  A number of cases relying on UCC section 2-403(1)(b), which gives the elevator 
voidable title and the power to transfer good title to a good-faith purchaser for value, have held that 
it does.  Because the definition of “purchaser” in UCC sections 1-201(29) and (30) includes a 
secured party, generally the only question is whether the secured party acted in good faith.  See 
U.C.C. § 2-403(1). 
Farmer probably has a purchase money security interest but to obtain an enforceable security 
interest under section 9-203, farmer must have an authenticated agreement from the buyer.  As a 
practical matter an elevator will not grant farmer a security interest.  Thus, farmer is an unsecured 
creditor.  Even if elevator would grant a security interest, farmer would have to comply with the 
special requirements of section 9-324(b) which again are impossible to satisfy.  See supra note 25 
and accompanying text.  Under federal law, a qualifying unpaid seller of poultry, livestock, or 
perishable commodities is given priority over the perfected secured creditor of the buyer.  See 
generally 7 U.S.C. §§ 196(b), 197(b) (2006). 
 27. See, e.g., In re Marhoefer Packing Co., 674 F.2d 1139, 1140–41 (7th Cir. 1982) (initial 
lease term followed by the lessee’s option to exercise a number of choices); United States v. Ables, 
739 F. Supp. 1439, 1445 (D. Kan. 1990) (no reference to word lease but rent used); In re Cress, 106 
B.R. 246, 250 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989) (true lease under “economic realities” test); In re Int’l Plastics, 
Inc., 18 B.R. 583, 586 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982); Excel Auto & Truck Leasing, L.L.P. v. Alief Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 249 S.W.3d 46, 51–52 (Tex. App. 2007). 
 28. See U.C.C. § 9-505 (authorizing precautionary filings with no adverse impact on the issue 
of whether the document called a lease is in fact a lease). 
 29. 415 B.R. 486, 491 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2009). 
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under the UCC.30  Under UCC section 1-203,31 an agreement called a 
lease can be found to create a security interest in two ways.  The first is 
the so-called bright-line test set forth in UCC section 1-203(b).  The 
party asserting that it is a security interest must establish that 
consideration is to be paid for the term of the lease, the lease is not 
subject to termination, and one of the four possibilities set forth in UCC 
section 1-203(b)(1)–(4) exist.32  Second, if the bright-line test is not 
satisfied, the court must determine from all of the facts whether the 
economics of the transaction establish a true lease.33 
The court in In re Gateway Ethanol concluded that the bright-line 
test is not satisfied.34  The question is whether, under UCC section 1-
201(b)(4), the option purchase price at the end of the lease is nominal.35  
The court held it was not.36  Whether a price is nominal is determined at 
the time the agreement is signed not at the time the option may be 
exercised.37  The party asserting that the price was nominal has the 
burden of proof and the court concluded it did not carry its burden of 
proof.38 
The court then had to determine whether a true lease existed by 
examining all the facts of the case.39  In effect, the court said the test is  
 
                                                     
 30. Id. at 490. 
 31. U.C.C. § 1-203(b) provides: 
A transaction in the form of a lease creates a security interest if the consideration that the 
lessee is to pay the lessor for the right to possession and use of the goods is an obligation 
for the term of the lease and is not subject to termination by the lessee, and: 
(1) the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the remaining economic life of 
the goods; 
(2) the lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods or 
is bound to become the owner of the goods; 
(3) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the 
goods for no additional consideration or for nominal additional consideration upon 
compliance with the lease agreement; or 
(4) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no additional 
consideration or for nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the lease 
agreement. 
 32. U.C.C. § 1-204(b)(1)–(4). 
 33. See U.C.C. § 1-204(a), (c), (e); see also In re Gateway Ethanol, L.L.C., 415 B.R. 486, 503 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 2009). 
 34. Gateway Ethanol, 415 B.R. at 503. 
 35. See id. at 499–500. 
 36. Id. at 502. 
 37. Id. at 500–01. 
 38. Id. at 497. 
 39. Id. at 503. 
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whether the lease provided the lessor a meaningful reversionary 
interest.40  As to facts of the case, the court stated: 
The Court, finds the Agreement to be a true lease based upon 
consideration of: (1) The anticipated useful life of the TO/Boiler; (2) 
IPE’s ability to market the TO/Boiler at the end of the lease term; (3) 
the amount of the lease payments in relation to the value of the 
TO/Boiler; (4) whether the TO/Boiler is unique because it was 
designed for installation in the Gateway plant; (5) whether at the time 
of the Agreement, the long term operation of the ethanol plan required 
Gateway’s continued possession of the TO/Boiler; and (6) the 
economic benefit to Gateway and Dougherty from the transaction being 
structured as a lease rather than a sale.41 
The court was also confronted with the claim that the “purchaser” 
should be estopped from asserting that the “lease” was not a true lease.42  
Two theories are considered under Kansas law: estoppel and quasi-
estoppel.43  The court explained that “[t]he traditional elements of the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel are: ‘(1) misrepresentation [of facts] by the 
party against whom estoppel is asserted; (2) reasonable reliance on that 
misrepresentation by the party asserting estoppel; and (3) detriment to 
the party asserting estoppel.’”44  Quasi-estoppel is established if it is 
determined it would be unconscionable to permit a party to benefit by 
taking a position that is inconsistent with one that the claimant has 
acquiesced to or from which the claimant accepted a benefit.45 
B. Scope Issues Regarding Agricultural Credit 
Scope issues involving agricultural credit have arisen in a number of 
areas.  Four particularly interesting ones involve real estate, the flow of 
payments from an installment land contract or contract for deed, and 
statutory liens. 
Questions relating to real estate have arisen in several situations: 
seller of land on contract repossesses land with growing crops subject to 
a perfected security interest of another; mortgagee forecloses real estate 
mortgage and claims growing crops that are subject to the perfected 
security interest of another; real estate mortgagee claims an interest in 
                                                     
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 505. 
 42. Id. at 496. 
 43. See, e.g., id. at 496–97 (analyzing the theories of quasi-estoppel and equitable estoppel). 
 44. Id. at 496–97 (quoting In re Isringhausen, 151 B.R. 203, 208 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1993)). 
 45. Id. at 497. 
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growing crops when the farmer-debtor files a bankruptcy petition.  Pre-
Article 9 cases hold that crops unharvested at the time of a real estate 
foreclosure are part of the real estate and pass with the land at 
foreclosure.  Today, it is clear that a real estate lender wanting an interest 
in growing crops must comply with Article 9.  This is true in all of the 
situations just set out.46 
Another scope issue concerns the flow of payments under a contract 
for deed or an installment land contract.  Consider this hypo: 
First, on January 2, Owner sells land to Buyer who signs a contract to 
make monthly payments over 20 years; second, on January 10, Owner 
borrows money from Bank and the land and the proceeds from the 
contract are used as collateral.  Bank does not file a financing 
statement; third, on March 1, Owner files bankruptcy petition. 
                                                     
 46. UCC section 9-334(i) states “A perfected security interest in crops growing on real property 
has priority over a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real property if the debtor 
has an interest of record in or is in possession of the real property.”  Also, growing crops are 
specifically included in the definition of goods under Article 9 UCC § 9-102(a)(44)(iv).  This section 
defines “goods” as: all things that are movable when a security interest attaches. The term includes 
(i) fixtures, (ii) standing timber that is to be cut and removed under a conveyance or contract for sale, 
(iii) the unborn young of animals, (iv) crops grown, growing, or to be grown, even if the crops are 
produced on trees, vines, or bushes, and (v) manufactured homes.  U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(44) 
The Kansas Supreme Court in Moritz Implement Co. v. Matthews considered a mortgage 
foreclosure on land with unsevered crops subjected to a perfected security interest.  959 P.2d 886, 
892 (Kan. 1998).  It held that Article 9 is the exclusive statutory scheme governing security interests 
in growing crops.  Id. at 890.  Thus, anyone claiming an interest in the crops to satisfy an unpaid 
debt is subject to Article 9.  Moreover, the court held that a perfected security interest in crops 
remained attached after the redemption period expires in a mortgage foreclosure sale even though 
the real estate had been transferred as a result of the foreclosure sale.  Id. at 892. 
What about growing crops on real estate transferred under a transfer-on-death (TOD) deed and 
Article 9?  In the case of In the Matter of the Estate of Henry M. Roloff, the court held that the TOD 
deed transferred the growing crops on the real estate when the deed was devoid of any language 
reserving the growing crops.  143 P.3d 406, 408 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).  It should be noted that crops 
are treated as personal property in a number of situations other than Article 9.  For example, K.S.A. 
section 59-1206 states: “Annual crops, whether severed or not from the land of the decedent at the 
time of death, shall be deemed personal assets in the custody of the executor or administrator and 
shall be inventoried and administered as such.”  § 59-1206 (2007).  The court in Roloff held that this 
section did not apply because a TOD deed is like a joint tenancy.  Roloff, 143 P.3d at 694–95.  In 
both cases no title passes by descent and distribution but rather under a conveyance independent of 
the estate.  Id. at 691.  Also, according to Roloff, Article 9 was not relevant because the transferred 
crops were not subject to a security interest.  Id. at 693.  Absent anything in the statute to the 
contrary, if the crops were subject to an enforceable security interest, Article 9 applies. See KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 59-3504(b); cf. U.C.C. §§ 2-105, 2-107. 
What if the land, at the time of death, had been leased by a person who had a life estate?  The 
doctrine of emblements becomes relevant.  Growing crops are treated as personal property when 
lessor who had a life tenancy in the land dies and both the estate of the lessor and the remainder 
person claim the crops or their proceeds.  See Finley v. McClure, 567 P.2d 851, 854 (Kan. 1977).  
For a general discussion of crops and the scope of Article 9 that is still relevant to the current version 
of Article 9, see Keith G. Meyer, A Potpourri of Agricultural U.C.C. Issues: Attachment, Real 
Estate-Growing Crops and Federalization, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 741, 754–56 (1989). 
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Does Article 9 apply?  Yes, Article 9 applies to the flow of payments and 
bank does not have a perfected security interest because it did not file a 
financing statement. 
Section 9-109(d)(11) provides that Article 9 does not apply to “the 
creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real property, including a 
lease or rents thereunder . . . .”  However, the monthly payments are 
personal property under Article 9.47  Under the former version of Article 
9, the payments were considered in most states, including Kansas, to be 
general intangibles which had to be perfected by the filing of a financing 
statement centrally.48  Because Bank in our hypo filed no financing 
statement, it is an unperfected secured creditor.49  Bank is unperfected 
under the current version of Article 9 also.  However, the flow of 
payments is classified as an account, not a general intangible.  Revised 
Article 9’s definition of account is much broader than under former 
Article 9.50  Revised Article 9 defines an account to include the right to 
payment of a monetary obligation for “‘property’ that has been sold, 
leased, licensed, assigned or otherwise disposed of . . . .”  The term 
property covers both personal as well as real property.51  Former Article 
9’s definition of accounts covered only monetary obligations arising 
from the sale of goods.  “Goods” was defined to include only personal 
property and fixtures.52  Because revised Article 9’s definition of account 
includes the right to payment for “property” sold, the flow of payments 
under an installment land contract or a contract for a deed is now treated 
as an account instead of a general intangible.53  A security interest in 
both accounts and general intangibles is perfected by filing centrally.54  
However, a fatal error will occur if the payments are improperly 
                                                     
 47. See, e.g., In re Huntzinger, 268 B.R. 263, 266 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2001).  The UCC does not 
define personal property.  Yet, section 9-109(a)(1) provides that Article 9 applies to any 
“transaction, regardless of form, that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures . . . .”  
Clearly, goods (consumer, equipment, farm products, and inventory) are personal property.  See 
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(44); see also § 9-102(a)(23), (33), (34)–(35), (48).  While not explicitly called 
personal property, clearly the types of property that can be subject to a security interest such as 
accounts, chattel paper (tangible), commercial tort judgments, deposit accounts, documents, 
electronic chattel paper, general intangibles, instruments, investment property, and manufactured 
homes are personal property.  See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1217 (6th ed. 1990) (defining 
“personal property” as “everything subject to ownership, not coming under denomination of real 
estate” and a “right or interest in things personal . . .”). 
 48. See, e.g., In re Huntzinger, 268 B.R. at 267. 
 49. See, e.g., In re Nittolo Land Development Ass’n, Inc., 333 B.R. 237 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2005); In re Huntzinger, 268 B.R. 263. 
 50. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2)(ii) & cmt. 5(a). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See U.C.C. §§ 9-105(h), -109 (1972) (amended 2001). 
 53. Compare U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2)(ii), with § 9-102(a)(42). 
 54. U.C.C. §§ 9-310, -501(a)(2).  But see U.C.C. § 9-309 (2) and (3). 
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described in the security agreement and financing statement.  Types of 
collateral can be used as descriptions under sections 9-108 and 9-504, but 
if a drafter today describes this type of collateral as a payment intangible 
or general intangible, he will be an unsecured creditor as well as 
unperfected.55  This problem can be avoided by simply describing the 
collateral in lay terms such as “the monthly payments under the contract 
for deed between buyer and seller dated . . . .” 
Both the former and revised versions of Article 9 cover the sale of 
accounts.  Under the former version, if Owner, in above example, were 
to have sold the right to receive the flow of payments to Bank instead of 
using them for collateral, Bank did not have to worry about Article 9.  
Former Article 9 did not apply to the sale of general intangibles and the 
flow of payments was considered a general intangible.56  However, under 
Revised Article 9, the flow of payments is an account and the sale of 
accounts is within the scope of Article 9.57  This means Bank—as a 
buyer of accounts—is considered a secured party and has to file a 
financing statement to be perfected.58 
The installment contract transactions raise some other interesting 
issues.  For example, the written contract will typically include all of the 
provisions necessary to make it an “instrument” under Article 9.59  A 
negotiable instrument is a separate, distinct type of collateral and can be 
perfected by possession or by filing a financing statement.60  Moreover, it 
must be properly described in an authenticated security agreement.  The 
safest course for Bank would be to take possession of the contract to 
avoid any holder-in-due-course issues.61 
Similar issues arise when a real estate mortgage is being taken as 
collateral.  Two documents are often involved: a promissory note and a 
real estate mortgage that secures the note—often called “two-tiered” 
                                                     
 55. See § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (stating that a security agreement must contain an adequate 
description for attachment); 9-108 (outlining requirements for a description to be adequate). 
 56. See U.C.C. §§ 9-106, -102(1)(b) (1972) (amended 2001). 
 57. § 9-109(a)(3); supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 58. See §§ 9-109(a)(2), -102(a)(72)(D) (stating that secured party includes the buyer of 
accounts); 9-102(a)(28)(B) (stating that debtor includes the seller of accounts); 1-201(37) (stating 
that a security interest includes the interest of a buyer of accounts). 
 59. §§ 9-102(a)(47), -104; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-102(a)(47) (2008). 
 60. It is important to note that the current UCC defines “promissory note” to mean: “an 
instrument that evidences a promise to pay a monetary obligation, does not evidence an order to pay, 
and does not contain an acknowledgment by a bank that the bank has received for deposit a sum of 
money or funds.”  U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(65) (2009). 
 61. See § 3-302.  Also remember that no authenticated security agreement is needed when the 
secured party has possession.  Clearly, the secured party still must show that the debtor granted a 
security interest in the contract.  See §§ 9-203(b)(3)(B), -201(b)(3). 
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collateral.  The promissory note will most times be treated as a 
negotiable instrument under Article 9.  Anybody claiming a security 
interest in an instrument must comply with Article 9’s attachment and 
perfection rules.  Moreover, any priority dispute is controlled by Article 
9.62  Official comment 7 to UCC section 9-109, dealing with security 
interests in an obligation secured by land, confirms this conclusion: 
Example 1: O borrows $10,000 from M and secures its repayment 
obligation, evidenced by a promissory note, by granting to M a 
mortgage on O’s land.  This Article does not apply to the creation of 
the real-property mortgage.  However, if M sells the promissory note to 
X or gives a security interest in the note to secure M’s own obligation 
to X, this Article applies to the security interest thereby created in favor 
of X.  The security interest in the promissory note is covered by this 
Article even though the note is secured by a real-property mortgage.  
Also, X’s security interest in the note gives X an attached security 
interest in the mortgage lien that secures the note and, if the security 
interest in the note is perfected, the security interest in the mortgage 
lien likewise is perfected.63 
Now, returning to the installment land contract hypo, what happens 
if Buyer under the installment contract and Owner who granted the 
lender a security interest in the flow of payments both default?64  
Presumably, real estate law controls who gets the real estate.65  Some 
states have non-uniform Article 9 rules dealing with the recording of 
installment contracts in the real estate records.66 
Before concluding the discussion of scope, it is appropriate to 
consider a non-Article 9 issue related to installment land contracts that is 
of more interest given the current popularity of owner financing.  The 
issue concerns risk that Buyer under an installment land contract has if 
Owner, seller, files a bankruptcy petition.  Buyer has some risk in 
Kansas, but the problem can be easily avoided.  Consider this hypo: 
January 2, 2008, O sells Green Acre to B pursuant to a land installment 
contract for $100,000.  B makes a down payment of $10,000 and is to 
pay the remaining $90,000 plus interest at 8% in twelve equal 
                                                     
 62. See Provident Bank v. Home Mortgage Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 63. § 9-109 cmt. 7. 
 64. Also, consider what happens when the real estate mortgagee defaults on the promissory 
note secured by the real estate mortgage and the mortgagor who had granted a security interest in the 
real estate mortgage defaults on its obligations to the lender. 
 65. See Dale A. Whitman, Transfers by Vendors of Interests in Installment Land Contracts: 
The Impact of Revised Article 9 on the Uniform Commercial Code, 38 J. REAL PROP., PROBATE & 
TRUST 421 (2003). 
 66. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 336.9-619 (2008). 
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installments over the next twelve years.  B is living on the land.  The 
installment land contract is not recorded. 
January 2, 2010, two years after the sale, O files a bankruptcy petition. 
The trustee in bankruptcy (TIB) under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) is 
considered to be a bona fide purchaser of real estate of the debtor.  If B 
does not have legal title, which is probably the case in Kansas, the TIB 
can claim that he can defeat B’s equitable claim to Green Acre as a bona 
fide purchaser of the real estate from O.67  B may be protected because 
B’s possession may be sufficient notice to defeat any claim the TIB may 
have as a bona fide purchaser.68  Arguably, this problem can be easily 
avoided in Kansas by the filing of an affidavit of equitable interest as 
provided in section 79-3102(d)(5) of the Kansas statute.69 
The last real estate scope issue concerns federal farm payments for 
land placed in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).  Courts have 
struggled with whether these payments are personal property.70  As you 
will recall, UCC section 9-109(d)(11) excludes from coverage “the 
creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real property, including a 
lease or rents thereunder . . . .”71 
After thoroughly considering the cases and issues, a Kansas 
Bankruptcy Court in In re Isenbart, held that CRP payments are personal 
property rather than rent of real estate.72  They are in the nature of 
contract rights, general intangibles, or accounts under Former Article 9.73  
This decision was decided when Former Article 9 was in effect.  Clearly, 
Revised Article 9 applies to any transaction creating a security interest in 
personal property, which the CRP payments are under this decision.  The 
question is, how are the CRP payments classified under Revised Article 
9?  Comment 5 to Revised Article 9 section 102 provides: 
This Article does not contain a defined term that encompasses 
specifically rights to payment or performance under the many and 
                                                     
 67. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3). 
 68. See McCannon v. Marston, 679 F.2d 13, 17 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding possession by the buyer 
prevented the TIB from winning under § 544(a)(3)). 
 69. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3102(d)(5).  The statute provides in part: “No registration fee 
whatsoever shall be paid, collected or required for or on: . . . any mortgage or other instrument given 
in the form of an affidavit of equitable interest solely for the purpose of providing notification by the 
purchaser of real property of the purchaser’s interest therein . . . .” 
 70. See, e.g., In re Isenbart, 255 B.R. 62 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2000). 
 71. U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(11) (2001). 
 72. 255 B.R. at 67. 
 73. Id. 
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varied government entitlement programs.  Depending on the nature of a 
right under a program, it could be an account, a payment intangible, a 
general intangible other than a payment intangible, or another type of 
collateral.  The right also might be proceeds of collateral (e.g. crops).74 
In my opinion, the court reached the correct result.  CRP payments 
are like virtually every other farm program payment that deals with 
payments based upon the farmer’s land.  The government is not the 
lessee but is a party to a contract under which the farmer promises to do 
certain things and the government in return promises to pay a certain 
amount.  It is not a conveyance of land.  The government has no right to 
possess or farm the land.  If CRP payments are considered to be personal 
property, the classification of a government payment becomes important 
and it is in my opinion a general intangible virtually like every other 
farm program payment.  If the farm program payment is classified as a 
payment intangible, both the sale of the farmer’s right to receive program 
payments, as well as the transaction creating a security interest in the 
payment intangible to secure a loan, are covered by Revised Article 9.75  
“Payment intangible” is defined to mean: “a general intangible under 
which the account debtor’s [federal government’s] principal obligation is 
a monetary obligation.”76 
C. Miscellaneous Scope Issues 
Two other scope issues that will not be discussed in any detail here 
involve current Kansas issues.  One relates to statutory agricultural liens 
and the other to extracted oil and gas and their proceeds. 
One of the most significant revisions of Article 9 in 2001 concerned 
nonpossessory liens in agricultural products.  For the first time, a 
nonpossessory statutory lien defined as an “agriculture lien”77 is subject 
to Article 9’s perfection, priority, and enforcement rules.  Every state 
except Kansas included this coverage in some form.  The Kansas 
legislature excluded from the coverage of Article 9 nonpossessory 
agricultural liens in farm products created by the statutory liens listed in 
                                                     
 74. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5(i) (2001). 
 75. § 9-109(a)(1), (3) (2009). 
 76. § 9-102(a)(61).  “General intangible” is defined in section 9-102(a)(42) as “any personal 
property, including things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, 
deposit accounts, documents, goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters 
of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction.  The term includes payment 
intangibles and software.”  § 9-102(a)(42). 
 77. § 9-102(a)(5). 
0.6.0_MEYER FINAL 5/31/2010  2:12:45 PM 
1134 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
sections 84-9-102(a)(76) and 9-102(a)(5) of the Kansas Statutes.78  
Creditors thinking about, or taking a security interest in farm products in 
Kansas have a variety of statutory liens to consider.  These liens have no 
uniformity as to creation, perfection, priority, and enforcement.  This 
uncertainty also applies to the purchasers of farm products subject to a 
statutory lien.  I have discussed these issues extensively in a prior 
article.79 
Another issue that must be mentioned briefly concerns extracted oil 
and gas.  Before extraction, oil and gas are treated as real property.80  
Article 9 now covers “as-extracted collateral.”81  The term “as-extracted 
collateral” is defined in UCC section 9-102(a)(6) and refers to oil, gas, or 
other minerals that are subject to a security interest before extraction 
from the ground and attaches to the minerals as extracted.82  Upon 
extraction, minerals become personal property.83 
Three recent bankruptcy court decisions dealing with conflicts 
between secured creditors and unpaid producers of oil that were given 
special protections via non-uniform amendments to Article 9 are 
significant.84  Non-uniform amendments to the perfection rules did not 
protect the unpaid producers.85 
III. PERFECTION 
A. In General 
In general, attachment makes the security interest enforceable against 
the debtor and it allows the secured party to pursue its remedies on 
default as articulated in Part 6 of Article 9, whether or not the security 
                                                     
 78. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-201(b)(2) (purporting that Article 9 is subject to state statutes 
that create a different rule “including, but not limited to, K.S.A. sections 2-1319, 2-2608, 2-3007, 
34-239, 47-836, 58-201, 58-203, 58-204, 58-207, 58-218, 58-220, 58-221, 58-241, 58-242, 58-2524, 
58-2525, 58-2526, 58-2527, 58-2528 and 84-7-209 . . . .”).  Most of these sections deal with 
agricultural liens. 
 79. Meyer, Unique Treatment, supra note 13. 
 80. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 4(c) (2009). 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See generally In re SemCrude, L.P., 407 B.R. 140 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (giving protection 
through Oklahoma special statutes, one being a Lien Act); In re SemCrude, L.P., 407 B.R. 112 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (allowing for Texas automatic perfection for unpaid producers); In re 
SemCrude, L.P., 407 B.R. 82, 2009 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (limiting a Kansas purchase money 
security interest by Kansas statutory law). 
 85. See generally sources cited supra note 84. 
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interest is perfected.86  A security interest cannot be perfected until it has 
attached and all steps required for perfection are taken.87  Perfection is 
required to protect the security interest against third parties, such as 
purchasers of collateral subject to a security interest, other creditors, and 
the trustee in bankruptcy.  Remember that perfection does not give 
protection against the entire world.88 
B. Certificate of Title Collateral 
Unless a specific section provides otherwise, the normal way to 
perfect under Article 9 is to file a proper financing statement centrally.89  
Security interests in motor vehicles (also boats in some states) that are 
subject to certificate of title statutes must be perfected by notation on the 
                                                     
 86. See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, -203(a), -601(a). 
 87. Perfection is designed to give public notice of a security interest.  See U.C.C. §§ 9-308, -
501.  Section 9-308 defines perfection: 
(a) [Perfection of security interest.] Except as otherwise provided in this section and 
Section 9-309, a security interest is perfected if it has attached and all of the applicable 
requirements for perfection in Sections 9-310 through 9-316 have been satisfied.  A 
security interest is perfected when it attaches if the applicable requirements are satisfied 
before the security interest attaches. 
Attachment is defined and controlled in general by UCC section 9-203.  In general, value must 
be given, the debtor must have rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral 
to a secured party, and an appropriate agreement creating a security interest must be executed.  
Sections 9-203(b)(1) and 1-201(44) deal with value.  For a thorough discussion of attachment 
requirements see JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1185–93 
(6th ed. 2010); Keith G. Meyer, Current Issues and Agricultural Credit, 10 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 105, 
135–63 (2005). 
In general, depending upon the type of collateral, perfection can occur in seven possible ways: 
(1) by filing, section 9-310; (2) through possession by secured party, section 9-313; (3) automatically 
upon attachment, section 9-309; (4) possessing certificate of title, sections 9-310(b), 9-311; (5) 
through control, sections 9-104 and 9-314; (6) temporarily, section 9-312(d), (e); and (7) through an 
assignment of a perfected security interest under section 9-310(b). 
 88. For example, UCC section 9-320(a) allows the buyer in the ordinary course to cut off a 
perfected security interest in inventory.  A valid perfected security interest in after-acquired 
inventory, livestock, and software or equipment or other goods that are not inventory or livestock 
lose to a later perfected qualifying purchase money security interest (PMSI) in inventory, livestock, 
software or equipment, or other goods that are not inventory or livestock.  Put another way, the 
“dragnet clause” that covers not only collateral for an immediate loan, but also loans made in the 
past or the future will give the lender priority dating from the time the financing statement is filed 
unless a qualifying subsequent PMSI holder surfaces.  See U.C.C. § 9-324 (2009).  Specifically, see 
UCC sections 9-322 cmt. 5 and 9-323 cmt. 3 dealing with future advances.  See generally Meyer, 
Purchase Money Security Interest, supra at note 13. 
A recent case upholding a “dragnet clause” in a non-agricultural setting is Pride Hyundai, Inc. v. 
Chrysler Financial Co., 369 F.3d 603 (1st Cir. 2004).  However, perfection which occurs more than 
ten days after the creation of the security interest and within ninety days of bankruptcy will probably 
be set aside as a preferential transfer under § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code unless a purchase 
money security interest is involved.  See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4), (c)(3); U.C.C. § 9-103. 
 89. See generally U.C.C. §§ 9-310, 9-501. 
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title except for those that are held as inventory by a person in the 
business of selling goods of that kind.90  If a vehicle or boat is not subject 
to a certificate of title statute, other perfection rules apply.  For example, 
if the collateral is equipment not subject to a certificate statute, the 
normal filing rules apply.91  If the collateral is a consumer good and a 
purchase money security interest (PMSI) is involved, the security interest 
is automatically perfected.92  On the other hand, the automatic perfection 
rule does not apply when the vehicle is subject to a certificate of title 
statute—even if the debtor is a consumer and the financing enabled the 
debtor to acquire the vehicle.93 
Thus, the crucial question is whether the vehicle or boat is subject to 
a certificate of title statute.  Normally, the question is whether the vehicle 
or boat must be registered and have a license tag issued.94  In general, 
nonhighway vehicles are not covered by certificate of title statutes.  In 
Missouri, an Arctic Cat snowmobile is not a “motor vehicle” subject to 
the Missouri certificate of title statute.95  Thus, a creditor who establishes 
a PMSI in consumer goods is automatically perfected upon attachment 
and does not have to deal with a certificate a title.96  This issue also arose 
in an Ohio bankruptcy case.  In In re Palmer, debtor, a dog kennel 
owner, signed a purchase and loan agreement in his individual name and 
stated that the compact utility tractor and front loader would be used for 
his personal use.97  The tractor was not subject to the Ohio certificate of 
title statute.  The issue was whether the tractor was a consumer good and 
subject to the automatic perfection rule.  The court noted that the burden 
of inquiry is on the creditor to determine the intended use of the 
collateral.98  The court held that the tractor seller was justified in relying 
on debtor’s representations that the tractor was for personal use, making 
it a consumer good under Article 9.99  The seller had a PMSI in consumer 
goods and therefore could rely upon the automatic perfection rule for 
PMSI’s in consumer goods and did not have to file a financing statement 
                                                     
 90. Id. §§ 9-310(b)(3), 9-311; cf. 9-309(1) (stating that consumer goods subject to a treaty or 
statute do not perfect on attachment). 
 91. See § 9-310(a). 
 92. § 9-309(1). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-127 to 28 (2008). 
 95. In re Lance, 59 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 632 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006). 
 96. Id. 
 97. 365 B.R. 816, 817 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007). 
 98. Id. at 822 (“When a creditor fails to make an inquiry and instead assumes what the use of 
the product will be, it does so at its own risk.”). 
 99. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(23) (consumer goods are goods “used or bought for use primarily for 
personal, family, or household purposes”). 
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to be perfected.100  Again, note that the tractors were not subject to a 
certificate of title statute. 
Kansas law on the perfection of vehicles is worth a closer 
examination.  Basically, vehicles are divided into two classes: vehicles 
that must be registered—so-called highway vehicles—and those that 
need not be registered—so-called nonhighway vehicles.101  The general 
rule has been that registered vehicles are subject to the certificate of title 
statute and nonregistered vehicles are not.102  The rules dealing with 
certificate of titles and security interests have changed in a variety of 
ways in the last six years.  Three of these are considered here.  First, on 
January 1, 2003, the legislature altered the rules to recognize electronic 
certificate of titles.103  Then, on July 1, 2007, the rules were changed by 
expressly providing that perfection of a security interest in a vehicle 
subject to the certificate of title statute occurred “upon the mailing or 
delivery of the notice of security interest and tender of the required 
fee.”104  Last, on July 1, 2009, the term “farm tractors” was removed 
from the list of collateral subject to the certificate of title statute referred 
to in K.S.A. section 84-9-311.105 
Each of these changes will be considered.  The 2007 change dealing 
with perfection by mailing of a notice of a security interest was 
considered in the case of In re Hicks.106  In this case, Credit Union had 
obtained a PMSI in a Ford SUV and had Debtor sign a properly 
completed “Notice of Security Interest” (NOSI) that was mailed with the 
appropriate fee to the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR).  KDOR 
received the NOSI, but the NOSI was not entered into its computer.  
When Debtor filed his application for title, no mention was made of 
Credit Union’s security interest in the vehicle.  KDOR issued a 
certificate of title with no liens noted on it. 
Debtor filed a Chapter 7 and the trustee attacked Credit Union’s 
claim to the Ford as being unperfected because its lien was not noted on 
the certificate as required by the Kansas certificate of title statute, K.S.A. 
                                                     
 100. § 9-309(1). 
 101. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-127 (2009) (requiring registration of vehicles “intended to be 
operated upon any highway in this state”). 
 102. See § 8-135(c), (c)(5). 
 103. See § 8-135d(a), (b).  Changes have been made in a variety of areas.  For example, several 
statutes were changed concerning “Micro utility truck.”  See, e.g., §§ 8-2401, -126, -128, -197, -
1486, and -2118.  Also changes have occurred as to titled manufactured homes, all-terrain vehicles 
(ATV), work site utility vehicles, and “Micro utility trucks.”  These have been made subject to the 
electronic filing procedures when perfecting a security interest. 
 104. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-311. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 491 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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section 8-135(c).  The bankruptcy court agreed but it was reversed by the 
federal district court.  The district court held that under the statute the 
lender was perfected when the proper NOSI was deposited in the mail 
notwithstanding the motor vehicle division’s failure to get the lien noted 
on the title.  In effect, the district court held that a creditor is perfected by 
a proper notation on the title or the mailing of a proper NOSI.  The Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and held that 
under Kansas law the filing of a NOSI lost its effectiveness once KDOR 
issued a certificate of title showing no lien. 
As noted above, the 2007 Kansas Legislature in an apparent response 
to In re Hicks, amended Kansas’s version of UCC section 9-311(a) 
dealing with perfection and vehicles subject to a certificate of title by 
providing: 
Such security interest shall be deemed perfected upon the mailing or 
delivery of the notice of security interest and tender of the required fee 
to the appropriate state agency as prescribed by subsection (c)(5) of 
K.S.A. 8-135 and subsection (g) of 58-4204, and amendment (i) of 58-
4204, and amendments thereto . . . .107 
Some interesting questions still remain unanswered.  What happens 
when a NOSI is received by the department but no lien is noted on an 
issued certificate of title and the vehicle is sold or the vehicle is used as 
collateral for a new loan?  Does the purchaser take free of original 
creditor’s security interest?  Does the first creditor have priority over a 
second creditor who took a security interest in a vehicle that had a clean 
certificate of title?  Is the purchaser or the second creditor to be treated in 
the same manner as the trustee in bankruptcy who is not a reliance 
creditor?  These issues are made more complex in view of the fact that, 
since January 1, 2003, no paper certificate of title exists for a vehicle 
subject to a security interest (lien).108  Rather, the title to the vehicle is 
maintained electronically by the Department of Revenue’s Division of 
Motor Vehicles.  It is my understanding that titles without liens are still 
issued as paper certificates, and paper certificates will be issued once any 
lien is released.109  Notwithstanding, the new electronic rules and the fact 
                                                     
 107. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-311. 
 108. Beginning in 2003, the Kansas E-lien program enabled financiers to file a “Notice of 
Security Interest” (NOSI) electronically.  For financiers to be able to make electronic filings, they 
must be registered with the Kansas Division of Motor Vehicles.  See Welcome to the Kansas Motor 
Vehicle Electronic Lien Filing and Release System, http://www.ksrevenue.org/Kselien.htm (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2010).  See also Forms and Publications: Motor Vehicles, http://www.ksrevenue.org 
/forms-dmv.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2010). 
 109. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-153(d) (2009).  The NOSI is Kansas Department of Revenue 
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that Kansas’s current version of UCC section 9-311(a)(2) provides that 
perfection of a security interest in a vehicle subject to the certificate of 
title statute occurred “upon the mailing or delivery of the notice of 
security interest and tender of the required fee,”110 nothing is said about 
priority rules.  Obviously, section 9-311 deals with perfection and unless 
otherwise provided, the normal priority rules of Article 9 apply when 
more than one party claims the same collateral. 
While the UCC filing rules are not directly applicable to certificate 
of title perfection issues, section 9-517 (indexing errors), and section 9-
516(d) (creditors who rely on an erroneous filing) should be considered 
by analogy.  Section 9-517, dealing with filing office errors when a 
properly completed financing statement is submitted, states: “The failure 
of the filing office to index a record correctly does not affect the 
effectiveness of the filed record.”  This section applies to the proper 
submission of the record with fee to the filing office.  Interestingly, no 
mention is made of certificates of title.  Compare this with the language 
of UCC section 9-311(b), which again is a perfection rule not a priority 
rule.  It is also interesting to compare section 9-516(d), which is a 
perfection rule, but contains a priority rule within it.  Section 9-516(d) 
deals with a situation where the filing officer inappropriately rejects a 
proper financing statement.  Notwithstanding the fact that no filing 
exists, the creditor is considered perfected except as to “purchasers” of 
the collateral who give value in reasonable reliance upon absence of the 
filing.111  The term “purchase” applies only to liens created voluntarily, 
                                                                                                                       
form TR-730.  Notice of Security Interest, http://www.ksrevenue.org/pdf/forms/tr730.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2010).  When a bank has loaned the money for the purchase or the seller is 
providing the financing of the purchase of a new or used car, the debtor is required to apply for the 
title.  The creditor, to be perfected before the security interest is noted on the title, must file a NOSI 
within thirty days after the vehicle is purchased.  The creditor can mail or deliver the properly 
completed NOSI.  Upon the mailing or delivering the properly completed NOSI the creditor is 
perfected.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-311. 
 110. U.C.C. § 9-311(a)(2). 
 111. See §§ 1-201(29), (30) (defining “purchaser” as one who voluntarily takes a security 
interest); 9-517.  This issue can arise under section 9-517 in several different ways.  For example, 
when a secured creditor submits a properly completed financing statement with the appropriate fee 
to the appropriate filing office but the financing statement is not filed or it is terminated without 
authority and without notification to the secured party.  Similarly, if secured party #1 properly 
submits a financing statement and the filing office files the financing statement under the wrong 
name, secured party #1 is perfected.  If secured party #2, after searching the records and finding no 
financing statement, loans money to debtor and obtains a perfected security interest, secured party #2 
will lose to secured party #1.  Secured party #1’s financing statement was mis-indexed but secured 
party #1 is considered to have filed first unless secured party #2 can fall under a special exception to 
the first to file rule. 
Is the filing office liable for mistakes?  Under former Article 9 many states enacted nonuniform 
provisions to insulate filing offices from liability except for willful conduct.  At least one state—
Kansas—has carried this forward in revised Article 9.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-523(f) (2009).  
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which means that the TIB as a lien creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) 
will not be able to use this section to defeat the creditor who is not of 
record.  Also, note that UCC section 9-520(c) applies a similar rule when 
the filing officer improperly accepts a financing statement that contains 
incorrect information that is required by UCC section 9-516(b)(5) such 
as the mailing address of the debtor or an inappropriate designation of 
business status.112 
At least one court has concluded that certificate of title perfection 
issues are not subject to the same perfection standards as set forth in 
Article 9.  In In re Laursen, the court held that Article 9 rules regarding 
the debtor’s name do not apply to certificate of title errors in the debtor’s 
name.113  Under Idaho law, Creditor was perfected even though there was 
a one character error in Debtor’s name on the certificate of title—
”Whitney, but it is listed as ‘Whitnet.’”114  Debtor’s name is not as 
crucial to notice system for vehicles as it is for the notice system in the 
UCC.  The vehicle identification number is paramount.115 
                                                                                                                       
Other states that had similar protections under former Article 9 included Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin.  See Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. 
v. Dep’t of State, 426 N.W.2d 717 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988), rev’d, 444 N.W.2d 786 (Mich. 1989). 
 112. U.C.C. § 9-520(c). 
 113. 391 B.R. 47 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2008). 
 114. Id. at 49. 
 115. Federal tax liens present another area where Article 9 rules dealing with the debtor’s name 
and the minor error rule have been held inapplicable.  According to the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit in In re Spearing Tool and Mfg. Co., federal tax liens were not subject to the exact 
match standard for searches under Article 9.  412 F.3d 653 (6th Cir. 2005).  Spearing Tool 
apparently means that someone searching for Article 9 financing statements and I.R.S. liens will 
have to search more than just the legal name of the debtor.  It is interesting to speculate whether 
filing offices will develop two search engines.  Also, if the search engine exists for nonlegal names, 
it would seem that this search will turn up incorrect legal names. 
UCC section 9-506(c) deals with whether the minor error rule can apply to a filed financing 
statement containing an incorrect debtor name.  This section provides that a financing statement 
substantially complying with the requirements of the 9-500 sections is effective even if it has minor 
errors or omissions unless those errors or omissions make the financing statement seriously 
misleading.  A financing statement containing an incorrect debtor’s name is not seriously misleading 
under UCC section 9-506(c) if a search of the records of the filing office under the debtor’s correct 
name, using the filing office’s standard search logic (if any) discloses the financing statement filed 
under the incorrect name.  The key questions are: (1) what is the debtor’s correct name and (2) what 
is the official search logic of the filing office?  Many states’ filing offices are using an exact match 
search logic.  This means that a search under the correct name of an individual using the exact match 
logic will only produce a financing statement indexed under the identical name of the debtor.  In 
effect, there is no minor error rule when an exact match logic is used.  If the correct name of the 
debtor is the debtor’s legal name, financing statements filed under a nonlegal name are misleading 
because an exact match search would not find them.  Some states, like Kansas and Missouri, have 
promulgated regulations that define the search logic to be used.  See, e.g., KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 7-
17-22(a)(1)–(8). 
For recent cases dealing with the exact match search logic, see generally In re Borden, 353 B.R. 
886 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2006) (filed financing statement under “Mike Borden” when debtor’s name was 
Michael Borden was insufficient); In re Tyringham Holdings, Inc., 354 B.R. 363 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
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Another issue related to UCC section 8-135(c)(5) is that perfection 
by mailing a proper NOSI only applies to PMSIs and not to non-
PMSIs.116  The section’s language on its face is limited to PMSIs.  
Kansas’s analogue, K.S.A. section 8-135(d)(5), provides in relevant part: 
[U]pon sale and delivery to the purchaser of every vehicle subject to a 
purchase money security interest as provided in article 9 of chapter 84 
of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, and amendments thereto, the dealer 
or secured party may complete a notice of security interest and when so 
completed, the purchaser shall execute the notice, in a form prescribed 
by the division, describing the vehicle and showing the name and 
address of the secured party and of the debtor and other information the 
division requires.117 
When a non-PMSI is involved, the vehicle will already be owned by the 
debtor and either a paper or electronic title will exist.  While it is beyond 
the scope of this Article to deal with this issue in any detail, the secured 
party must get its lien noted on an existing title. 
Two types of title exist: a paper title or an electronic title.  If a paper 
title exists and the debtor has possession of the title, the secured party 
should note its lien on the existing title and deliver it to the appropriate 
county treasurer along with an application for Duplicate, Secured, or 
Reissued title found in form TR-720B.118  The debtor will also have to 
deal with filing a Duplicate Title Certification found in form TR-720B.  
When an electronic title is involved, the secured creditor must obtain 
from the debtor the current title and registration receipt (Form TR-200) 
and file it with an application for Duplicate, Secured or Reissued title 
form TR -720B. 
In short, any creditor, lender, or seller who wants to perfect a 
security interest in any vehicle subject to the certificate of title statute 
and not held as inventory must deal with the Kansas E-Lien program that 
went into effect in 2003 and was enhanced in 2009.119  It should also be 
noted that electronic filing procedures apply to titled manufactured 
homes, all-terrain vehicles, work site utility vehicles, and micro utility 
trucks. 
                                                                                                                       
2006) (financing statement that did not contain the same corporate name for the debtor as that on the 
public record for the State of Virginia, in that it omitted the “Inc.” from the end of debtor’s name, 
was seriously misleading). 
 116. U.C.C. § 9-103(a) (defining PMSI). 
 117. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-135(d)(5) (2009) (emphasis added). 
 118. For the appropriate forms see supra note 108. 
 119. The key agency here is the Kansas Division of Motor Vehicles, Titles and Registration 
Bureau.  See supra note 108. 
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IV. PERFECTED SECURED CREDITORS VERSUS BUYERS OF NON-FARM 
PRODUCTS 
A priority conflict arises when a debtor sells to a buyer a good 
subject to a security interest.120  The question is whether the secured 
creditor can replevin the good or sue the buyer for conversion.  Some of 
the various factual situations where this issue arises will be considered 
here. 
The general rule is found in UCC section 9-315(a)(1).  It provides 
that, except as otherwise provided by Article 9 or section 2-403(2), a 
security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale or exchange 
unless the secured party authorized the disposition free of the security 
interest or agriculture lien.121  In short, unless the buyer can point to a 
rule that protects the buyer, the buyer buys the good subject to the 
security interest.  One of the exceptions to the general rule is found in 
UCC section 9-320 that provides in part: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a buyer in ordinary 
course of business, other than a person buying farm products from a 
person engaged in farming operations, takes free of a security interest 
created by the buyer’s seller, even if the security interest is perfected 
and the buyer knows of its existence.122 
Another exception to the general rule is found in UCC section 9-
317(b) that provides: “[A] buyer, other than a secured party, of . . . 
goods . . . takes free of a security interest or agriculture lien if the buyer 
gives value and receives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of 
the security interest or agriculture lien and before perfected.”123 
Consider three hypos that are based upon these basic facts: On 
January 1 Bank loans $200,000 to Farmer (F) who grants Bank an 
enforceable security interest in all farm equipment including but not 
limited to a JD combine #1, a JD tractor, and a 350 Ford pickup truck.  
Bank files a proper financing statement in the correct office describing 
the collateral as “all equipment.”  Bank does not get its security interest 
noted on the Ford pickup’s certificate of title.  The pickup is used only 
for farm business but is driven on the highway. 
                                                     
 120. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(44) (2001) (defining “goods”). 
 121. § 9-315(a)(1). 
 122. § 9-320(a)(1). 
 123. § 9-317(b). 
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Hypo #1: Sale of the combine #1 to F2: 
On October 1, Farmer (F) sells combine #1 to Farmer 2 (F2) who pays 
F, takes delivery and does not know about Bank’s security interest.  
Bank does not know about the sale.  On November 1, F defaults on his 
obligations to Bank.  On December 1, Bank learns F2 has combine #1 
and files an action to repossess combine #1.  Who wins between Bank 
and F2? 
Bank should win.  The security interest is not cut off by F’s sale to 
F2.  Bank has a perfected security in the combine which under Article 9 
is equipment.124  No exceptions exist to protect F2 from the basic rule of 
section 9-315(a)(1) that the security interest follows the collateral 
notwithstanding sale.125  First, Bank did not know about the sale and did 
not authorize it.  Second, none of the so-called “buyer rules” found in 
section 9-320(a) or section 9-317(b) protect F2.  Section 9-320(a) does 
not help F2 because F2 is not a buyer in the ordinary course of 
business.126  The definition of a “buyer in ordinary course of business” in 
UCC section 1-201(9) requires that the buyer buy from someone in the 
business of selling goods of that kind.127  F1 is not in the business of 
selling combines.128  Section 9-317(b) does not apply because Bank had a 
perfected security interest before F2 bought the combine.129  The only 
possibility of Bank being unperfected is if combine # 1 was subject to the 
certificate-of-title rules requiring notation of the security interest on the  
 
                                                     
 124. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(33) “‘Equipment’ means goods other than inventory, farm products, or 
consumer goods.”).  “Goods” are defined in section 9-102(a)(44).  “Consumer goods” are defined in 
section 9-102(a)(23).  “Inventory” is defined in section 9-102(a)(48).  Farm products are defined in 
section 9-102(a)(34-35).  Equipment is perfected by filing.  § 9-310(a).  See also U.C.C. § 9-102 
cmt. 4a (explaining the use of “goods”). 
 125. See U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(1). 
 126. § 9-320(b) is another exception to the general rule that a security interest follows the 
collateral notwithstanding sale but it only applies to consumer goods in the hands of the seller and 
the buyer.  This exception obviously does not apply to this first hypo because the combine is 
equipment in the hands of the seller, F. 
 127. § 1-201(b)(9) (defining a “buyer in the ordinary course”). 
 128. The Kansas case of Ronald v. Odette Family Ltd. P’ship v. Ageo Fin., 129 P.3d 95 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 2005), involved facts similar to this hypo.  The court held that a buyer who purchased a 
tractor and loader subject to a perfected security interest from a farmer could not maintain a 
conversion action against the secured creditor who repossessed the tractor.  Id. at 102.  The seller 
was a farmer, not a dealer of tractors and loaders, and the buyer did not qualify as a buyer in the 
ordinary course.  Id. at 101.  The court indicated that the buyer could have concluded that a security 
interest was involved.  Id.  Remember, however, that mere knowledge of a security interest is not 
enough to prevent a buyer from being a buyer in the ordinary course.  See U.C.C. § 9-320 cmt. 3. 
 129. See U.C.C. § 9-317(b). 
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certificate of title.  In most states, including Kansas, combines are not 
subject to certificate-of-title rules.130 
The upshot is that Bank can get the combine from F2, who has lost 
both the combine and the money paid to F.  F2 has a cause of action 
under UCC section 2-312 for breach of warranty of title131 against its 
seller (F), but F is probably judgment-proof.  The risk of loss is placed on 
F2.  Buyers buying from a person not engaged in the business of selling 
the particular good run the risk that the good is subject to a perfected 
security interest and that seller will not pay off the debt after the sale.  
So-called “big ticket” items should raise an automatic red flag that they 
may be collateral for the purchase price.  Certainly, used combines are 
very expensive, easily $30,000 plus.  Moreover, most farmers finance 
“big ticket” purchases and therefore are aware of this possibility.  
Assuming that the secured party has acted reasonably and done 
everything a prudent secured creditor would do, the risk of loss is placed 
on the farmer-buyer. 
A legitimate issue is whether farm equipment like tractors and 
combines should be made subject to the certificate-of-title statutes.  
Arguably, such a rule would make it much easier for a buyer to 
determine if a combine or tractor was subject to a security interest.  Does 
it make sense to change the rule?  Some of the considerations include: 
(1) What are the costs and the benefits of changing the rule; (2) Is there a 
significant problem that would be solved by notation on the title; (3) 
How much more would it cost the system and the players if notation on 
the certificate of title, rather than filing a financing statement, became the 
rule; and (4) Would the process work better than requiring the farmer-
buyer to search the filed records?  In the past, it has been relatively easy 
for the buyers of used vehicles subject to certificate-of-title laws to 
determine if a lien existed.  To be perfected, the security interest had to 
be noted on the certificate of title.  Thus, prospective buyers simply 
asked to see a paper certificate. 
In Kansas, the advent of electronic titles for vehicles subject to the 
certificate-of-title rule complicated the sale process both for someone 
buying a vehicle and a lender who is being asked to finance the purchase 
of a used vehicle.  It is beyond the scope of this article to cover all of the 
details, but a few general observations are in order.  Cash sales of cars 
with paper titles with no liens are apparently the same today as before  
 
                                                     
 130. See supra Part III.B. 
 131. See U.C.C. § 2-312. 
0.6.0_MEYER FINAL 5/31/2010  2:12:45 PM 
2010] A GARDEN VARIETY OF UCC ISSUES 1145 
January 1, 2003.  Non-PMSI loans where a paper title exists without any 
liens noted on it are also apparently treated the same as before 2003.132 
Titles subject to liens have different rules.  If a paper certificate of 
title exists and has a lien noted on it, buyer and seller must execute a 
revenue Electronic Title Sales Agreement Form (TR-39a), which buyer 
delivers to the county treasurer.  This starts the process of getting a new 
title issued.  Since 2003, no paper title has been issued when a vehicle is 
subject to a lien until the lien has been paid and released.133  Any 
purchaser of, or financier of a purchaser of, a vehicle subject to a 
certificate of title must deal with Kansas’s E-lien program.134 
Hypo #2: F sells the tractor to F2: 
On October 1, F sells the tractor to F2, who pays F, takes delivery, and 
does not know about Bank’s security interest.  Bank does not know 
about the sale.  On November 1, F defaults on his obligations to Bank.  
On December 1, Bank learns F2 has tractor and files an action to 
repossess tractor.  Who wins between Bank and F2? 
Bank should win unless the tractor is subject to the relevant state’s 
certificate-of-title law requiring Bank’s security interest to be noted on 
the certificate of title.  Assuming the tractor is not subject to a certificate-
of-title statute, which is the case in most states,135 the analysis is the same 
as in Hypo #1.  As noted above, if a vehicle is subject to a certificate-of-
title statute, perfection rules other than filing apply.136 
Hypo #3: F trades Combine #1 to Dealer: 
On October 1, unbeknownst to Bank, F trades combine #1 in to Dealer 
as part payment of the purchase price for a new combine.  On October 
5, Dealer sells combine #1 to F2.  Bank does not know about the sale.  
On November 1, F defaults on his obligations to Bank.  On December 
                                                     
 132. See supra Part III.B. 
 133. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-135d(a) (Supp. 2008). 
 134. See supra Part III.B. 
 135. See generally Aaron K. Johnstun & Stephen J. Ware, Farm Tractors in Kansas: How to 
Perfect a Security Interest, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 409 (2009) (discussing Kansas’s system of subjecting 
tractors to the certificate-of-title rules rather than ordinary perfection rules).  But see U.C.C. §§ 9-
310(b)(3), -311(a)(2), -311(b) (setting out perfection rules for property subject to certificate-of-title 
statutes).  While most participants in the process believed that tractors were treated as equipment and 
not subject to the certificate-of-title laws, the 2009 Kansas legislature attempted to make this a clear 
rule by changing section 84-9-311 of the Kansas Statutes.  See 2009 Kan. Sess. Laws 631 (removing 
the word “tractor”). 
 136. See U.C.C. §§ 9-310(b)(3), -311.  The main Kansas certificate-of-title statute is K.S.A. 
section 8-135. 
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1, Bank learns that F2 has combine #1 and seeks replevin.  Who wins 
between Bank and F2? 
Bank wins.  The default rule of section 9-315(a)(1) applies again.  
Section 9-320(a) (buyer-in-ordinary-course rule) is no help to F2.  
Remember, section 9-320(a) has two requirements: (1) buyer must be a 
buyer in the ordinary course; and (2) F2’s seller must have created the 
security interest in combine #1.137  While F2 is a buyer in the ordinary 
course because it bought from someone in the business of selling goods 
of that kind, Dealer, who is the seller, did not create the security interest.  
F1 created the security interest.  Thus, F2 cannot satisfy both 
requirements of section 9-320(a), Bank’s security interest is not cut off, 
and F2 is subject to it.  What is F2’s remedy?  Again, F2 has a cause of 
action against Dealer under section 2-312 for breach of the warranty of 
title.  Dealer could have easily prevented this problem.  Dealer should 
have checked to see if anyone had filed a financing statement against F1 
and combine #1.  What if Bank cannot locate combine #1?  Bank will 
likely have a cause of action against Dealer for purchasing (by taking it 
on trade) combine #1 which was subject to the security interest.  
Conversion is a real possibility depending upon the elements needed to 
establish it.  Again, Dealer should bear the risk of loss. 
V. BUYERS OF GOODS FROM MERCHANTS WHO SELL GOODS 
ENTRUSTED TO THEM 
Under the entrustment doctrine of UCC section 2-403, a buyer in the 
ordinary course who buys from a merchant who deals in the type of 
goods sold can get better title than the seller had.138  This rule is 
illustrated in the following simple hypo: 
On January 2, O leaves watch to be repaired with Jeweler (J) who sells 
and repairs watches.  O does not authorize J to sell the watch.  On 
                                                     
 137. See U.C.C. § 9-320(a).  Buyer in ordinary course is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(9).  See 
infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 138. See UCC section 2-403, which provides, in relevant part: 
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind 
gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of 
business. 
(3) “Entrusting” includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of possession 
regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the delivery or acquiescence 
and regardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the possessor’s disposition 
of the goods have been such as to be larcenous under the criminal law. 
U.C.C. § 2-403(2), (3). 
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January 10, J sells watch to Heather (H).  On February 1, O seeks to 
replevy the watch or sue H for conversion.  Can H keep the watch? 
The relevant UCC sections are: 2-403(2)–(3),139 1-201(b)(9),140 and 2-
104(1).141  To win, H must show that an entrustment of goods occurred, 
that J sold the watch and was a merchant who dealt with watches, and 
that she was a buyer in the ordinary course of business.  If she establishes 
these three things, she wins even though J is in effect a thief because he 
sold the watch without authority.  H will almost always win. 
In general, the entrustment doctrine is a balancing of the risk of loss 
between owners and buyers.  It protects innocent buyers who buy from 
someone who has possession of the good and is in the business of selling 
goods of the kind.  O, the entruster, is in the best position to have 
prevented the problem by determining the honesty of the dealer.  This 
rule promotes the free flow of commerce.   Now consider this new hypo: 
January 2, O grants Bank a perfected security interest in her watch.  
February 3, O leaves watch to be repaired with Jeweler (J) who sells 
and repairs watches.  O does not authorize J to sell the watch.  February 
10, J sells watch to H.  February 15, O defaults on her obligation to 
Bank.  March 1, Bank seeks to replevy the watch or sue H for 
conversion.  Who wins between H and Bank? 
Here, it appears that H will lose to Bank.  Comment four to UCC section 
2-403 states: “Except as provided in subsection (1), the rights of 
purchasers other than buyers in ordinary course are left to the Articles on 
Secured Transactions [Article 9] . . . .”142  Section 2-403(1) states: “A 
purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had 
power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires 
rights only to the extent of the interest purchased.”143  And, UCC section 
2-403(2) gives the merchant the power to sell all the “rights of the 
entruster” to a buyer in the ordinary course.  Section 9-315(a)(1) 
provides that except as otherwise provided by Article 9 or section 2-
403(2), a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale or 
                                                     
 139. These subsections explain the entrustment rule and define entrustment. 
 140. This section defines a buyer in the ordinary course. 
 141. This section defines a merchant. 
 142. U.C.C. § 2-403 cmt. 4. 
 143. The second and third sentences of section 2-403(1) deal with situations where a person 
obtains voidable title in “transactions of purchase.”  The person with voidable title has the power to 
pass good title to a good faith purchaser.  This rule does not apply to our hypo because J did not 
obtain the watch in a transaction of purchase, U.C.C. § 1-201(29-30), but it was entrusted to J.  Thus, 
section 2-403(2) is the relevant section. 
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exchange unless the secured party authorized the disposition.  Section 9-
320(a) does not help H even though she is a buyer in ordinary course 
because J did not create the security interest involved.  What about 
section 2-403(2)?  Section 2-403(2) gives the merchant the power to 
transfer “all of the entruster’s rights.”  Because O, not J, created the 
security interest in the watch, her rights in the watch are subject to the 
perfected security interest.  A buyer takes the rights that merchant has the 
power to transfer.144  What is the policy justification for the risk of loss 
rule found in UCC section 2-403(2)?  Because J did not create the 
security interest, this result is consistent with section 9-320(a) that was 
considered in Hypo 3, supra Part II.B. 
If Bank knew that O had taken the watch to J, it is possible Bank’s 
acquiescence constituted entrustment by Bank and J then had the power 
to transfer all the rights of the entruster.145  Also, H could argue Bank 
was estopped from asserting its security interest because of the 
acquiescence. 
Hammer v. Thompson146 deals with a unique entrustment issue.  In 
Hammer, a person other than the owner of cattle had physical possession 
of the cattle, an “order buyer.”147  The “order buyer” allegedly sold cattle 
without the owners’ authority.148  The court dealt with whether the 
entrustment doctrine of UCC section 2-403 applied and, if so, how the 
requirements were applied to the facts.149 
A key question in cases where an owner’s goods are sold by another 
who had physical possession is what is the legal relationship between the 
alleged owner of the goods and the seller?  At least three possibilities 
exist: bailment, consignment, or creditor-debtor (unpaid seller and 
buyer).  The UCC handles these differently.  With one exception, Article 
9 does not deal with true consignments150 and does not cover true 
bailments.151  A bailment can be considered entrustment under section 2-
403(3) making section 2-403(2) applicable.152 
In Hammer, the owner placed cattle with Thompson for grazing on 
pasture land.153  Thompson sold the cattle to Morris who transferred them 
                                                     
 144. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-403(1). 
 145. § 9-320 cmt. 3, ex. 2. 
 146. 129 P.3d 609 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006). 
 147. Id. at 612. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 613. 
 150. U.C.C. §§ 9-102(20), -109(a)(4). 
 151. Cf. § 9-505. 
 152. Id. 
 153. 129 P.3d at 612. 
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to Hunt who transferred them to Tyson Foods.154  The owner was not 
paid and sued Morris, Hunt, and Tyson in conversion.155  The court 
examined the three requirements of section 2-403(2): did the owner 
entrust the goods; was Thompson a merchant that deals with cattle; and 
was Morris a buyer in ordinary course?156  As to the merchant issue, the 
court reviewed the somewhat unique Kansas cases on the definition of 
merchant under section 2-104(1), Decatur Cooperative Ass’n v. 
Urban,157 and Musil v. Hendrich.158  In Decatur, a farmer was held not to 
be a merchant for purposes of the statute of frauds’ merchant rule under 
U.C.C. section 2-201.159  The court determined that the farmer was not a 
merchant because he did not “deal” in wheat and did not have any 
special knowledge of the practices or sales of wheat.160  He simply sold 
his own crop locally for cash.  In Musil, a hog farmer was held to be a 
merchant for purposes of applying the implied warranty of 
merchantability under U.C.C. section 2-314.161  Applying the same test 
of Decatur it was clear that farmer was a dealer in hogs.162  He had been 
in the business for more than thirty years and was selling fifty to one 
hundred hogs a month.163  These cases were not directly applicable to 
U.C.C. section 2-403(2) in that they did not specifically focus on the 
requirement that the merchant must be a person “who deals in goods of 
that kind.” 
In Hammer, Thompson was described as an “order buyer” who acts 
as a middle person between a seller and buyer.164  The issue was whether 
an “order buyer” can be a merchant that “deals in goods of that kind.”  
The Kansas courts have not addressed this issue, but K.S.A. section 47-
1804(c) defines “livestock dealer.”  In part, the statute provides that a 
                                                     
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 614. 
 157. 547 P.2d 323 (Kan. 1976). 
 158. 627 P.2d 367 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981). 
 159. 547 P.2d at 329.  UCC section 2-201(2) provides: 
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a record in confirmation of the contract 
and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know 
its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against the recipient unless 
notice of objection to its contents is given in a record within ten days after it is received. 
See also U.C.C. § 2-104 cmt. 2. 
 160. Decatur, 547 P.2d at 328. 
 161. Musil, 627 P.2d at 373. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Hammer v. Thompson, 129 P.3d 609, 614 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006). 
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person is a dealer if the person sells as an agent.165  It would appear that 
this definition would cover an “order buyer.”166  And, the court found 
instructive the Washington case of Heinrich v. Titus-Will Sales, which 
held a person did not have to possess an inventory to qualify as a 
merchant under UCC section 2-403(2).167 
The owner in Hammer asserted that Thompson was not an order 
buyer, but a person who intended to run growing lots.168  Morris and the 
other buyers, on the other hand, asserted that Thompson was a merchant 
dealing in cattle, and qualified as a merchant under section 2-403(2).169  
The trial court in Hammer held that whether Thompson was a merchant 
was a matter of law and that Thompson was a merchant.170  This holding 
was reversed in part by the Kansas Court of Appeals, which held that the 
issue was a mixed question of law and fact.171  “Whether there exist 
circumstances to constitute merchant status is a question of fact.  But 
whether those facts that are determined constitute a person as a merchant 
is a question of law.”172  The appellate court then determined that there 
was no dispute as to the fact that Thompson entered into a number of 
sales that showed he was a dealer.173  Thus, the trial court did not err in 
finding Thompson was a merchant as a matter of law. 
The next question faced was whether Morris qualified as a buyer in 
ordinary course of business.174  UCC section 1-201(9) provides in part 
that a buyer in ordinary course of business is a person “that buys goods 
in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of 
another person in the goods, and in the ordinary course from a person, 
other than a pawnbroker, in the business of selling goods of that kind.”175  
The appellate court held that there was a material issue of fact as to 
whether Morris was a buyer in ordinary course because the evidence did 
not show Morris acted in good faith.176  More specifically, the issue was 
whether Morris followed reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing 
in the cattle trade.  UCC section 2-103(1) provides: “In this article unless 
                                                     
 165. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1804(c) (2007). 
 166. Hammer, 129 P.3d at 615. 
 167. Heinrich v. Titus-Will Sales, Inc., 868 P.2d 169, 173–74 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). 
 168. Hammer, 129 P.3d at 616. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 621. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 622. 
 174. Id. 
 175. U.C.C. § 1-201(9). 
 176. Hammer, 129 P.3d at 623. 
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the context otherwise requires: (b) ‘Good faith’ in the case of a merchant 
means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing in the trade.”177  If Morris qualifies as a buyer in 
ordinary course from a merchant who deals with goods of that kind, the 
sale of entrusted goods to Morris gives him owner’s title, which was an 
unrestricted good title.  Any subsequent buyer from Morris, regardless of 
whether that buyer could qualify as a buyer in ordinary course, obtains 
the benefit of Morris’s title.  Conversely, if Morris cannot qualify under 
UCC section 2-403(2), Morris takes Thompson’s title, which was no 
title, and all subsequent purchasers take subject to owner’s claims under 
UCC section 2-403(1). 
Another situation where the entrustment issue arises is when a 
farmer stores grain in an elevator and receives a warehouse receipt.  
When farmer goes to sell his grain, the elevator is bankrupt and does not 
have enough grain to satisfy all of the people holding valid and 
enforceable warehouse receipts.  Farmer learns that elevator has sold 
almost all of its grain to Archer-Daniels Midland Company (ADM).  Can 
farmer get its grain from ADM?  UCC section 7-205 provides: “A buyer 
in ordinary course of business of fungible goods sold and delivered by a 
warehouse that is also in the business of buying and selling such goods 
takes the goods free of any claim under a warehouse receipt even if the 
receipt is negotiable and has been duly negotiated.”178  This means that a 
farmer who has stored grain as well as a person who holds a negotiable 
warehouse receipt will not be able to recover from a qualified buyer from 
a warehouse that fails, even if the farmer can trace his or her grain to the 
buyer.  This is the entrustment concept of UCC section  2-403(2).  
Remember, the goods must be sold and delivered.  UCC section 1-
201(b)(15) defines deliver with respect to electronic documents of title, 
negotiable instruments, tangible documents of title and chattel paper, but 
not goods.  Delivery for the negotiable instruments, tangible documents 
of title and chattel paper means “voluntary transfer of possession.”179  
Possession is not defined in the UCC.  No definition of delivery exists 
for goods in UCC section 1-201 or Article 7.  Thus, pursuant to UCC 
section 1-103(b), law other than the UCC controls. 
The delivery issue can arise under UCC section 7-205 in at least two 
different situations.  For example, fungible grain has been purchased and 
paid for, but is put in a rail car leased by the elevator.  The grain is to be 
                                                     
 177. U.C.C. § 2-103(1). 
 178. U.C.C. § 7-205; see also  §§7-501, -503. 
 179. § 1-201(b)(15). 
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transported to the buyer’s location.  Is this delivery?  Has risk of loss 
shifted to the buyer under UCC section 2-509?  What if the grain is 
deposited in a rail car that belongs to the buyer and the buyer’s name is 
on the car but the car is located on rail spur belonging to the seller?  
What if the grain was deposited in a train car of a commercial rail 
company? 
VI. PURCHASE OF FARM PRODUCTS SUBJECT TO A PERFECTED 
SECURITY INTEREST 
Under Article 9, the default rule of UCC section 9-315(a)(1) applies 
to the sale of farm products.  And, unless the secured party authorized 
the sale of farm products, buyer buys subject to a perfected security 
interest.  The buyer in ordinary course rule of UCC section 9-320(a) does 
not apply to the sale of farm products.  This controversial rule,180 was 
hated by buyers of farm products such as elevators and feedlots, and 
other buyers such as producers of pet food.  The buyers, unable to get 
Article 9 changed at the state level, eventually persuaded Congress to 
change the rule in 1986.181  Congress in effect repealed the farm products 
rule of former UCC section 9-307 and current UCC section 9-320(a).  
Comment 4 to UCC section 9-320 provides: 
Buyers of Farm Products.  This section does not enable a buyer of farm 
products to take free of a security interest created by the seller, even if 
the buyer is a buyer in ordinary course of business.  However, a buyer 
of farm products may take free of a security interest under Section 1324 
of the Food Security Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. § 1631.182 
Congress’s purpose in enacting 7 U.S.C. § 1631 was to shift the 
potential burden of the loss to lenders.  After 1986, buyers had no 
responsibility to search the records to determine whether the farm 
products they were buying were subject to a perfected security interest.   
 
                                                     
 180. This rule is discussed in many places.  See, e.g., Keith G. Meyer, The 9-307(1) Farm 
Products Puzzle: Its Parts and Its Future, 60 N.D. L. REV. 401 (1984). 
 181. See, e.g., Drew L. Kershen & J. Thomas Hardin, Congress Takes Exception to the Farm 
Products Exception of the UCC: Retroactivity and Preemption, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1988); Drew 
L. Kershen & J. Thomas Hardin, Congress Takes Exception to the Farm Products Exception of the 
UCC: Centralized and Presale Notification Systems, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 383 (1988); Keith G. 
Meyer, UCC Issues, 8 J. AGRIC. TAX’N & L. 153 (1986); Keith G. Meyer, Congress’s Amendment to 
the UCC: The Farm Products Rule Change, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Sept.–Oct. 1996, at 17; Steven W. 
Sanford, The Reborn Farm Products Exception Under the Food Security Act of 1985, 20 UCC L.J. 3 
(1987). 
 182. U.C.C. § 9-320 cmt. 4. 
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The secured creditors had the burden to provide notice of the security 
interest to a potential buyer. 
Under 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d), the general rule is that the buyer in the 
ordinary course183 takes free of a perfected security interest created by 
his seller in farm products even though the buyer knows of its existence, 
and state law provides otherwise unless it has received appropriate notice 
under subsection (e).184  It is important to note that § 1631 applies only to 
the sale of farm products.185  While Article 9’s definition is somewhat 
different, presumably courts will use it by analogy as well as the cases 
dealing with it.186  The cases dealing with Article 9’s definition prior to 
2001 are particularly relevant in that the definitions at that time were 
very similar.187  Today they are different.188  Under subsection (e), a 
                                                     
 183. The term “buyer in the ordinary course” is the same term used in the UCC.  U.C.C. § 1-
201(a)(9).  However, it is defined differently in 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(1).  When one compares the 
definitions, unlike the UCC definition, buyer’s knowledge of a perfected security interest and good 
faith of the buyer are irrelevant under § 1631.  7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(1). 
 184. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d). 
 185. Again, the term farm products is used in both UCC section 9-102(b)(34)–(35) and in 7 
U.S.C. § 1631.  The term is defined in 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(5).  The federal definition has not been 
updated like Article 9’s definition was in 2001.  See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(34)–(35), cmt. 4a (2009). 
 186. For central filing systems, 9 C.F.R. § 205.211(a) (2010) provides: 
Court decisions under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), about the scope of the 
“farm products” exception in Section 9-307(1) thereof, and interpreting the terms therein, 
particularly “person engaged in farming operations” which is not defined in the Section, 
are applicable to an extent in interpreting the Section.  The basis of this is the legislative 
intent of the Section to pre-empt State laws reflecting that “farm products” exception, as 
shown in the House Committee Report on Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99-271, Part 1, September 
13, 1985, at pages 108 et seq. 
 187. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(5) states: 
The term “farm product” means an agricultural commodity such as wheat, corn, 
soybeans, or a species of livestock such as cattle, hogs, sheep, horses, or poultry used or 
produced in farming operations, or a product of such crop or livestock in its 
unmanufactured state (such as ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup, milk, and eggs), 
that is in the possession of a person engaged in farming operations. 
Former Article 9 in § 9-109 defined farm products as follows: 
[C]rops or livestock or supplies used or produced in farming operations or if they are 
products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states (such as ginned cotton, 
wool-clip, maple syrup, milk and eggs), and if they are in the possession of a debtor 
engaged in raising, fattening, grazing or other farming operations.  If goods are farm 
products they are neither equipment nor inventory. 
Compare U.C.C. § 9-109(3) (1999) (defining farm products to require that the debtor have 
possession), with U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(35) (2009) (expanding the definition to include reference to 
aquaculture).  For a general discussion of the term “farm products,” see Meyer, supra note 180, at 
412–15. 
Some courts narrowly construed the term “farming operation” within these definitions by 
limiting it to a traditional farming operation, while others defined it more broadly.  Compare K.L. 
Smith Enter. v. United Bank of Denver, N.A., 2 B.R. 280, 283–84 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980) 
(construing farming operation broadly), and In re Charolais Breeding Ranches, Ltd., 20 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (CBC) 193, 196–97 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1976) (construing farming operation broadly), with 
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buyer of farm products takes subject to a security interest created by the 
seller if appropriate written notice was received from the lender or seller, 
or if the state has a “central filing system,” and the buyer has received 
the appropriate notice from the Secretary of State.189  At least nineteen 
states have a “Central Filing System.”190  The same basic rule applies to 
commission merchants or selling agents.  They will not be subject to a 
perfected security interest even if they know of its existence, if they sell 
                                                                                                                       
John M. Saums, Inc. v. Blease, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 450, 453 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1978) (stating 
that “[t]o be [engaged in] farming operations the debtor must actually be engaged in farming, not 
farm related or farm support or farm like activities”), and In re Collins, 3 B.R. 144, 149 (Bankr. D. 
S.C. 1980) (holding that “‘farming operations’ is to be narrowly construed”). 
Part-time farmers can operate a “farming operation.”  See 11 U.S.C. § 101(18) (1994) (defining 
farmer based on percentage of income); see also Blease, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 454 (holding that 
“equipment must be used directly to perform tasks customarily done on farms”); Armstrong v. Corn 
Belt Bank, 55 B.R. 755, 761 (D. Ill. 1985) (stating that rent income does not make lessor a farmer); 
In re Dakota Lay’d Eggs, 57 B.R. 648, 656 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1986) (holding that “the determination 
must be made by considering the character of the business” and the source of its income). 
For cases dealing with breeding syndicators, see Estate of A.R. Levis v. Blankinship-Cooper, 
Inc., 43 B.R. 231, 236 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984) (holding that breeding rights in a horse were 
properly characterized as goods); In re Bob Schwermer & Assocs., Inc., 27 B.R. 304, 308 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1983) (stating that race horses are not farm products); North Ridge Farms, Inc. v. Trimble, 
37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 1280, 1286 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that horse owners who race 
horses do not run a farming operation). 
 188. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(34)–(35) provides: 
(34) “Farm products” means goods, other than standing timber, with respect to which the 
debtor is engaged in a farming operation and which are: 
  (A) crops grown, growing, or to be grown, including: 
 (i) crops produced on trees, vines, and bushes; and 
 (ii) aquatic goods produced in aquacultural operations; 
  (B) livestock, born or unborn, including aquatic goods produced in aquacultural 
operations; 
  (C) supplies used or produced in a farming operation; or 
  (D) products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states. 
(35) “Farming operation” means raising, cultivating, propagating, fattening, grazing, or 
any other farming, livestock, or aquacultural operation. 
Compare U.C.C. § 9-109(3) (1999) (defining farm products to require that the debtor have 
possession) with U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(35) (2009) (expanding the definition to include reference to 
aquaculture).  Also, the issue of whether a good is a farm product or equipment or inventory has 
been often litigated.  7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(5)’s definition of farm product is found supra note 187. 
 189. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e) (2006). 
 190. ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.29.501, 44.37.027 (West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-9.5-104 (West 
2002); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 28-9-523, 28-9-501 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:3655 
(2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 90-A (2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336A.04 (2010 Supp.); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-9-501 (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-401(1)(n) (West 2009); NEB. 
REV. ST. § 52-1301 (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. § 439:3(I) (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-
13-4 (West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE, §§ 54-09-09, 41-09-73 (2008); OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 12a, § 1-
9-320.6 (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80.106 (West 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-9-
525.3 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-9a-320(6)(b) (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-501, 9-302 
(2007); W.VA. CODE ANN. 46-9-523 (West 2002 Supp.); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-21-1102 
(2007). 
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in the ordinary course of business a farm product subject to a perfected 
security interest and have not received an appropriate notice.191 
7 U.S.C. § 1631 preempts the states from legislating in this area.192  
States cannot attempt to further protect buyers or lenders.  Under the 
statute, states have the power to choose only: (1) what constitutes 
receipt;193 and (2) one of two notice alternatives developed in detail by 
Congress.194  Kansas implemented Alternative One: Written Notice 
Provided by Lender or Seller.  Under this option, as noted above, if the 
buyer receives, within one year before the sale, a proper written notice 
from the lender or seller, and the buyer does not comply with payment 
instructions in the notice, the buyer takes subject to a perfected security 
interest in farm products created by the seller. 
How does Lender know what buyer to notify?  Lender may require 
in the security agreement that the borrower supply a list of buyer names.  
If Debtor sells to a buyer not on the list and neither notifies the Lender 
seven days before the sale nor remits the proceeds within ten days after 
the sale, the farmer shall be fined $5000 or fifteen percent of the value of 
the farm products, whichever is greater.  Many creditors have obtained 
Debtor’s permission to send blanket notices to potential buyers of farm 
products.  Some have sent blanket notices without obtaining Debtors’ 
express consent. 
What if the secured party sends a written notice to the buyer but the 
notice does not contain the required information?  Courts are split as to 
whether the minor-error rule, set forth in 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(4)(H) 
dealing with a “central filing system,” applies to direct notices given in 
states that do not have a central filing system.  The so-called minor-error 
rule provides that an “effective financing statement” containing errors is 
still effective if the errors are “not seriously misleading.”195  First 
                                                     
 191. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(g).  Commission merchant is defined in § 1631(c)(3) and selling agent in § 
1631(c)(8).  For an interesting case, see Deere & Co. v. Miller-Godley Auction Co., 549 S.E.2d 762 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2001).  This case involved an auctioneer.  Id. at 763.  An auctioneer who sells a good 
subject to a perfected security interest is liable for conversion.  Id. at 766.  The Court notes that 
every other state that has considered this issue has concluded that the auctioneer can more easily 
search the records than a prospective buyer can.  Id. at 765.  Moreover, if third parties are permitted 
to ignore filed financing statements, Article 9’s notice system is rendered a nullity.  Id.  Accordingly, 
the auctioneer must search public records for filed financing statements.  Id. at 765–66. 
Remember that if the auctioneer is selling farm products, the transaction should be covered by 7 
U.S.C. § 1631.  The auctioneer should be considered either a commission merchant or a selling 
agent, as defined in 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(3) and (8). The auctioneer will normally be protected unless 
he receives proper notice of the security interest.  7 U.S.C. § 1631(g). 
 192. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d) (2006). 
 193. § 1631(f), (g)(3). 
 194. § 1631(g)(2)(C)–(D). 
 195. § 1631(c)(4)(H). 
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National Bank & Trust v. Miami County Cooperative Ass’n196 applies a 
substantial compliance test to direct notice requirements notwithstanding 
no reference to a minor error rule in the requirements dealing with direct 
notice.197  The court points out that nothing in the legislative history of 
§ 1631 indicates that Congress intentionally omitted the minor error rule 
in the direct notice option and the legislative history seems to suggest 
that the two notice systems were intended to produce as uniform results 
as possible.  Accordingly, it was appropriate to apply the minor error rule 
to the direct notice option.  Thus, the court concluded that, from all the 
information provided the buyer, the buyer was not misled.198  Buyer 
could determine from the notice who would be selling the farm products 
and what specific farm products were subject to the secured party’s 
security interest.199  In other words, substance rather than form 
controlled.  Farm Credit Midsouth, PCA v. Farm Fresh Catfish Co. 
adopts a strict construction standard and concludes that the statute 
dealing with direct notice says nothing about minor errors therefore none 
applies.200  This court specifically rejects the Kansas court’s construction 
of the direct notice requirements in Miami County Cooperative Ass’n.201  
From my perspective, the Kansas court got it right! 
To make sure that we have a basic grasp of some of the quirks of 7 
U.S.C. § 1631, let us consider some basic hypotheticals. 
Section 1631 Hypo #1: Feedlot sale of cattle held for a short period of 
time: 
Bank has a perfected security interest in all cattle in Jones Feedlot.  
January 2, Jones Feedlot buys fifty head of distressed cattle (very rough 
                                                     
 196. 897 P.2d 144, 152 (Kan. 1995). 
 197. The court points out that nothing in the legislative history of 1631 indicates that Congress 
intentionally omitted the minor-error rule in the direct notice option and the legislative history seems 
to suggest that the two notice systems should be treated to produce as uniform results as possible.  
Accordingly, it was appropriate to apply the minor-error rule to the direct notice option. 
 198. First Nat’l Bank & Trust, 897 P.2d at 152. 
 199. See id. 
 200. 371 F.3d 450, 453 (8th Cir. 2004).  See also First State Bank of Athens Mabank Branch v. 
Purina Ag Capital Corp., 113 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).  Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc. v. 
Keybank Nat’l Ass’n deals with adequate notice under the direct or written notice option.  742 
N.E.2d 967 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).  After farmers defaulted on loans secured by their real and personal 
property, a secured creditor brought an action against corporation that had entered into a seed corn 
production agreement with farmers, alleging that the corporation had converted the collateral when it 
paid the farmers and their supplier with the proceeds of the seed corn sale.  Id. at 967.  The Court of 
Appeals held that the corporation received notice of the creditor’s security interest within one year of 
seed corn sale and thus was subject to the secured creditor’s perfected security interest in the 
proceeds from the sale.  Id. at 972. 
 201. Farm Credit Midsouth, 371 F.3d at 453. 
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cattle).  January 20, Feedlot after having the fifty head on a special diet, 
sells the rejuvenated cattle that Feedlot had purchased on January 2 to 
Rancher.  February 10, Feedlot defaults on its Bank loan.  Can Bank 
repossess the 50 head of cattle from Rancher?  Does 7 U.S.C. § 1631 
apply? 
For 7 U.S.C. § 1631 to apply to the sale of the cattle, Jones Feedlot must 
be selling farm products.  This means that Jones Feedlot must be 
engaged in a farming operation and have possession of the livestock in 
the farming operation.202  While running a feedlot is a farming operation, 
cattle trading is not.203  Normally, a feedlot operator would not buy and 
sell cattle so quickly.  The issue is whether this quick turn around sale 
makes Feedlot a trader and not an operation involved in the raising and 
fattening of animals.  If Feedlot never intended to fatten the fifty head 
and only intended to turn the cattle, it is not a farming operation.204 
Section 1631 Hypo #2: what impact does actual knowledge of a 
security interest have? 
Bank has a perfected security interest in all of Farmer’s crops.  July 1, 
Bank calls Elevator and specifically tells Elevator that Bank has a 
                                                     
 202. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 203. See Sec. Nat’l Bank v. Belleville Livestock Comm’n Co., 619 F.2d 840, 850 (10th Cir. 
1979) (holding that because the debtor was a cattle feeder rather than a cattle trader, his cattle should 
have been considered “farm products”); Farmers State Bank v. Webel, 446 N.E.2d 525, 529 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1983) (holding that a business that bought and sold feeder pigs was a marketing agency 
within the meaning of the comment to UCC section 9-109, and that the business was therefore 
selling inventory and not farm products); see also Swift & Co. v. Jamestown Nat’l Bank, 426 F.2d 
1099, 1102 (8th Cir. 1970) (holding that the plaintiff cattle-owner’s “‘fattening’ of livestock [fell] 
within the explicit terms of [U.C.C. § 9-109(3)]”); Burlington Nat’l Bank v. Strauss, 184 N.W.2d 
122, 125 (Wis. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that “[l]ivestock whether it makes sense to a dairy farmer or 
not, is classified as ‘farm products’ and not as inventory by sec. 409.109(3)” of the Wisconsin code); 
cf. Mountain Credit v. Michiana Lumber & Supply, Inc., 498 P.2d 967, 969 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972) 
(holding that a logging operation was not a farming operation); In re Maike, 77 B.R. 832, 839 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1987) (holding that a puppy kennel was a farming operation). 
It should also be noted that cattle cease to be classified as farm products and become part of the 
packer’s inventory after they have been slaughtered and packed, notwithstanding the fact that there 
was an oral agreement between the seller and the packer that title would not pass and price would 
not be determined until carcass grade was determined.  First Nat’l Bank v. Smoker, 286 N.E.2d 203, 
209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972).  See also Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238 (5th 
Cir. 1976); In re Underbakke, 60 B.R. 705, 708 (Iowa 1986) (concluding that farm products include 
milk).  Former UCC section 9-109(3) defines farm products to include milk, and read together with 
section 522(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, this section leads to the conclusion that a secured creditor 
who has a perfected security interest in the debtor’s cows and their milk pre-petition has a continuing 
interest in the milk produced post-petition.  11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1998); U.C.C. § 9-109(3) (1999).  
Revised Article 9 does not change this result. 
 204. See Sec. Nat’l Bank, 619 F.2d at 850 (factual inquiry as to whether operation is engaged in 
cattle trading as opposed to cattle feeding; typical feeding period is sixty to ninety days unless cattle 
already near sale weight). 
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perfected security interest in all of Farmer’s crops and when Farmer 
sells any crops it must issue a joint-payee check.  July 5, Farmer sells 
crops to Elevator.  Elevator did not cut a joint-payee check.  Farmer 
defaults and Bank sues Elevator in conversion.  Who wins? 
Again, under 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d), unless a buyer has notice under (e), 
a buyer who in the ordinary course buys farm products from a seller who 
created the security interest and is engaged in a farming operation takes 
free of a security interest even if it is perfected and buyer knows of its 
existence.205  Here the crops are farm products, seller is engaged in a 
farming operation, and Elevator buys the grain in the ordinary course of 
its business.  The issue is did Elevator have notice and is it a buyer in the 
ordinary course.  Assume this hypo occurred in a state that has the 
written direct notice alternative of 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(1), Elevator was 
not given proper notice.  Bank is required to give an appropriate written 
notice within one year of the sale.206  While Elevator had actual 
knowledge of Bank’s security interest and knew that Bank was not 
consenting to the sale free of a security interest unless a joint-payee 
check was issued, § 1631(e)(1) requires written notice.207  None was 
given. 
Is Elevator a buyer in the ordinary course of business?  Under the 
UCC definition, Elevator would not be.  UCC section 1-201(9) defines a 
buyer in the ordinary course of business in part as “a person that buys 
goods in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of 
another party to the goods.”208  Here Elevator had actual knowledge of 
the security interest and knew that Bank was not agreeing to the sale of 
                                                     
 205. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d). 
 206. See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc. v. Keybank Nat’l Ass’n, 742 N.E.2d 967, 972 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2001). 
 207. For a Kansas case that has 7 U.S.C. § 1631 overtones, see Ag Servs. of Am., Inc. v. 
DeBruce Grain, Inc., 19 P.3d 188 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001). 
 208. UCC section 1-201(b)(20) defines good faith as “except as otherwise provided in Article 
5 . . . honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”  
Comment 3 to UCC section 9-320(a) dealing with the buyer in the ordinary course of business 
speaks to the point of knowledge of a security interest and good faith. 
The definition of “buyer in ordinary course of business” in UCC section 1-201 restricts its 
application to buyers “from a person, other than a pawnbroker, in the business of selling goods of 
that kind.”  Thus subsection (a) applies primarily to inventory collateral.  The subsection further 
excludes from its operation buyers of “farm products” (defined in UCC section 9-102) from a person 
engaged in farming operations.  The buyer in ordinary course of business is defined as one who buys 
goods “in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another person in the 
goods.”  Subsection (a) provides that such a buyer takes free of a security interest, even though 
perfected, and even though the buyer knows the security interest exists.  Reading the definition 
together with the rule of law results in the buyer’s taking free if the buyer merely knows that a 
security interest covers the goods; but taking subject if the buyer knows, in addition, that the sale 
violates a term in an agreement with the secured party. 
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the grain free of the security interest.  Also, Elevator would probably not 
have acted in good faith because of its actual knowledge of Bank’s 
perfected security interest and that the sale was not authorized by Bank.  
However, unlike under the UCC, the definition of a buyer in the ordinary 
course has no knowledge or good-faith requirement.  Thus, it appears 
that absent the establishment of a contract between Elevator and Bank 
dealing with the sale of the grain, the Elevator takes free of Bank’s 
security interest.  It appears that estoppel and equitable principles like the 
so-called clean-hands doctrine do not apply.  Doubtless, courts would 
have trouble applying the minor-error test of Miami County Cooperative 
in that no written notice of any kind was given.209 
Section 1631 Hypo #3: What should a buyer do when it receives 
inadequate notice? 
FSA has a perfected security interest (PSI) in Farmer’s (F) crops, 
including all wheat.  FSA sends a letter to a number of elevators that 
states FSA has a PSI in all F’s wheat, lists F’s correct name and 
address, and directs Elevator to issue a joint-payee check to F and FSA.  
What are Elevator’s options? 
Upon receipt of the notice, Elevator could tell F of the notice and get 
F’s permission to issue a joint-payee check when F sells wheat.  Another 
possibility is to call Bank and tell them the notice is inadequate and if an 
adequate notice is not sent, it will issue a single-payee check to F when 
he sells.  The other possibilities are to make no efforts to contact anyone 
and either issue a check only in the name of F or issue a joint-payee 
check.  Certainly, if it is clear that the notice is inadequate, the buyer had 
no responsibility to issue a joint-payee check.  This probably violates F’s 
right to receive the money. 
On these limited facts, it appears that, unless a minor-error rule is 
applied, the letter does not satisfy the requirements of 7 U.S.C. § 
1631(e)(1).  Certainly, if it is clear that the notice is inadequate, the buyer 
had no responsibility to issue a joint-payee check.  Yet, others on these 
facts have issued multiple-payee checks that have caused significant 
difficulties in the farmer getting the check cashed. 
Most of the problems with the direct-notice system can be avoided 
by a state adopting the so-called “central filing system.”210  In a 1986 
                                                     
 209. First Nat’l Bank & Trust v. Miami County Coop. Ass’n, 897 P.2d 144, 152 (Kan. 1995).  
See supra notes 195–200 and accompanying text. 
 210. See 7 U.S.C. § 1631(b)(2); see also Arthur H. Travers & John L. McCabe, A Central Filing 
System for Financing Statements, COLO. LAW., Sept. 1999, at 5. 
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Kansas Bar Journal article,211 I argued that the central filing system was 
not the best alternative.  I have changed my mind.  With the maturing of 
the electronic filing systems and the consumer friendly computer 
programs, the parties that have a stake in this venture such as the Kansas 
Banker’s Association, the Kansas Feed and Grain Association, the 
various farm groups such as the Farm Bureau, the Secretary of State’s 
office and the Kansas Bar Association should work together to change 
the central filing system.  This system would have to be approved by the 
Packers and Stockyard Administration.212  The experience of the nearby 
states of Colorado and Nebraska will be instructive and Minnesota has a 
rich history as well.  While this system is not perfect, it has less chances 
of errors and litigation possibilities than the direct written notice system 
does. 
As the impact of 7 U.S.C. § 1631’s notice options are considered, it 
is important to remember that bank regulators will struggle with how to 
classify loans secured by crops when the lender does not have an 
organized method to deal with the notice requirements of 7 U.S.C. § 
1631.  Given the current credit crisis, this issue may be more closely 
examined.  Compliance for lenders is certainly more easily established if 
the state has a “central filing system.”  And, a “central filing system” 
arguably deals more effectively with notification of buyers that are in a 
state other than where the debtor is located.213 
The following section deals with persons selling grain subject to a 
security interest when the actual physical person selling the grain did not 
create the security interest.  The problem can arise in a state having a 
central filing system such as Minnesota and South Dakota as well as in a 
state like Kansas that has a direct notice system. 
VII.SALE OF FARM PRODUCTS SUBJECT TO A PSI NOT CREATED BY 
SELLER 
Two state supreme courts, Minnesota and South Dakota, have 
considered this issue, reaching different results.  The Minnesota Supreme 
Court, in Fin Ag, Inc. v. Hufnagle, Inc.,214 was confronted with a 
situation where a debtor, Buck, who had created a security interest in 
                                                     
 211. Keith G. Meyer, Congress’s Amendment to the UCC: The Farm Products Rule Change, 55 
J. KAN. B. ASS’N 17 (1986). 
 212. The regulations dealing with the establishment of a central filing system are found at 9 
C.F.R. § 205 (2009). 
 213. See 9 C.F.R. § 205.210 (2009). 
 214. 720 N.W.2d 579, 580 (Minn. 2006). 
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farm products, sold some of the farm products.  Some of the farm 
products subject to the security interest created by Buck were sold by 
others.215  Buck granted Fin a perfected security interest in corn.  Buck 
was engaged in a farming operation and corn is clearly a farm product 
under Article 9 as well as 7 U.S.C. § 1631.216  Minnesota is a central 
filing state for 7 U.S.C. § 1631 purposes and Fin Ag filed a proper 
effective financing “statement” (EFS) required by the central filing 
system.  Kent Meschke Poultry Farms, Inc. (Meschke), a registered farm 
products dealer,217 received a list of potential sellers, including Buck, 
whose corn was subject to a security interest.  Meschke purchased corn 
directly from Buck and from the Tookers (employees of Buck and minor 
children of Buck) who were not listed as having corn subject to a 
security interest.  Tookers, the sellers, apparently represented that they 
owned the grain.218 
Buck defaulted on his loan and Fin Ag sued Meschke for conversion 
of grain subject to its perfected security interest.219  Meschke asserted it 
purchased the grain free of any security interest because the Tookers 
were not listed as sellers on the 7 U.S.C. § 1631 information received 
from the Minnesota Secretary of State.220  Thus, it did not have notice of 
the security interest as required by § 1631.221 
The court held Meschke purchased the grain subject to the security 
interest.222  The court had no trouble with the corn sold by Buck 
himself.223  7 U.S.C. § 1631 controls a priority battle between the secured 
party and the buyer of farm products.224  Under § 1631(d) “[e]xcept as 
provided in subsection (e) of this section . . . a buyer who in the ordinary 
course of business buys a farm product from a seller engaged in farming 
operations shall take free of a security interest created by the 
seller . . . .”225  Buck was engaged in a farming operation, was the seller, 
and was the person who created the security interest in the farm products 
sold.226  Meschke was a buyer who in the ordinary course purchased 
                                                     
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. See 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(2)(D). 
 218. Fin Ag, 720 N.W.2d at 580. 
 219. Id. at 584. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 589. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 582. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
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grain but Meschke had received proper notice under (e) of Fin Ag’s 
security interest because Meschke had received a proper list showing 
Buck’s grain was subject to Fin Ag’s security interest.227 
The Tookers sale was much more difficult.  Here the court was 
confronted with a situation where the persons selling the corn did not 
create the security interest in the corn and were apparently selling corn 
under their name for an unnamed party (Buck) who had created the 
security interest.228  The court framed the issue as how 7 U.S.C. § 1631 
worked in “fronting sales,” i.e. farm products that are subject to a 
security interest created by a debtor who has a third party sell the grain 
under the third party’s name?229 
According to the court, the nondebtor sellers could possibly be 
treated as either: (1) agents selling on behalf of Buck as an undisclosed 
principal; (2) as “commission agents” or “selling agents,” defined under 
7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(3),(8); or (3) as owners of corn, selling on their own 
behalf.230  The court applied the general rule of 7 U.S.C. § 1631 that the 
buyer takes free of a perfected security interest created by his seller 
unless the buyer received appropriate notice.231  The keys are who is the 
seller and who created the security interest. 
The seller could be Buck as an undisclosed principal or the Tookers.  
Either way, according to the court, Meschke takes subject to Fin Ag’s 
security interest.232  If Buck is considered the seller, Meschke received 
notice of Fin Ag’s security interest and took subject to it.233  If the 
Tookers are considered the sellers, Meschke still purchased the corn 
subject to the security interest.234  If they are the owners, they took the 
corn from Buck subject to the security interest because they were not 
buyers in the ordinary course.235  Moreover, the Tookers did not create 
the security interest and thus cannot satisfy the requirement that the seller 
must have created the security interest at issue.236  Also, 7 U.S.C. § 
1631(g) dealing with commission merchants and selling agents does not  
 
                                                     
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 584. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 586. 
 232. Id. at 587. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
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apply here because the sellers did not register as commission or selling 
agents as required by 7 U.S.C. § 1631.237 
Lastly, Meschke argued that the grain was inventory in the hands of 
the Tookers, not farm products, and that he took free of Fin Ag’s security 
interest.238  Even if the corn were inventory, section 9-320(a) requires 
that the seller must have created the security interest.239  Tookers did no 
such thing.240  In most conflicts concerning the sale of farm products 
subject to a security interest, the scoundrel is the farmer and the buyer 
and the creditor are relatively innocent.  This was the case here.  Fin Ag 
and Meschke were treated as innocent parties because each had done all 
that it could to protect itself. 
Two years after Hufnagle was decided, the South Dakota Supreme 
Court considered 7 U.S.C. § 1631 in three cases dealing with the sale of 
farm products that were subject to a security interest.  The court in effect 
rejected the Minnesota Supreme Court’s approach as to who is a seller.  
The three are: Fin-Ag, Inc. v. Pipestone Livestock Auction Market, 
Inc.,241 Fin-Ag, Inc. v. Watertown Livestock Auction, Inc.,242 and Fin-Ag, 
Inc. v. Cimpl’s, Inc.243  The United States Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in Pipestone,244 but the issues considered in Pipestone are in 
effect the same issues considered in Watertown and Cimpl’s.  Each will 
be discussed in some manner here. 
In Fin-Ag, Inc. v. Cimpl’s, Inc., Fin-Ag loaned money to the Berwald 
Brothers, who executed a security agreement granting Fin-Ag a security 
interest in farm products.245  A financing statement (FS) and effective 
financing statement (EFS) were filed with the Secretary of State.246  The 
FS showed the debtor as “Berwald Partnership” and described the 
collateral as all livestock and farm products.247  The EFS covered farm 
products such as dairy cattle and milk and listed the debtor as the  
 
                                                     
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 585. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 587. 
 241. 754 N.W.2d 29 (S.D. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009). 
 242. 754 N.W.2d 23 (S.D. 2008). 
 243. 754 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 2008). 
 244. Fin-Ag, Inc. v. Pipestone Livestock Auction Mkt., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2859, 2859 (2009). 
 245. 754 N.W.2d at 3. 
 246. Id. at 3–4. 
 247. Id. at 4 & n.2. 
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“Berwald Partnership.”248  The security agreement and EFS required 
joint-payee checks when any cattle were sold.249 
Cattle subject to the Fin-Ag security interest and belonging to the 
Berwalds were sold to Cimpl, a packer, who was registered with the 
Secretary of State’s central filing system and received the monthly 
registry master list showing Fin-Ag’s debtors and collateral subject to 
security interests.250  When cattle were delivered to Cimpl, the physical 
deliverer was issued a receiving ticket.251  It showed that the deliveries 
were made by a Berwald including one of the brothers or the brother’s 
father who was not part of the partnership.252  Cimpl was informed that 
the cattle were being sold by C & M Dairy (C & M).253  According to the 
majority opinion, Cimpl did not know that C & M was a d.b.a. used by 
two of the Berwald brothers to buy and sell cattle.254  After a check of the 
EFS registry did not disclose C & M, Cimpl issued a single payee check 
to C & M.255 
The Berwalds defaulted and Fin-Ag sued Cimpl in conversion 
asserting Cimpl converted Fin-Ag’s collateral when it purchased the 
cattle and did not remit to it any proceeds or list it as a payee.256  Fin-Ag 
essentially made two arguments: (1) 7 U.S.C. § 1631 does not protect 
Cimpl: because it knew in fact that the seller was the Berwald brothers; 
and (2) section 1631 protects only those buyers who buy from a seller 
who created the security interest involved, and Cimpl’s seller did not 
create the security interest.257  The majority rejected both arguments.258  
As to whether the buyer had notice of who the seller was, the majority 
concluded that the only notice that is important is what was obtained 
from the filed EFSs and who was on the registry list.259  C & M was not 
listed.260  Thus, Cimpl purchased the cattle free of a security interest 
because C & M Dairy was not listed in the registry it received from the 
Secretary of State.261 
                                                     
 248. Id. at 4. 
 249. Id. at 3. 
 250. Id. at 4. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 5. 
 256. Id. at 4–5. 
 257. Id. at 6. 
 258. Id. at 12. 
 259. Id. at 11. 
 260. See id. at 3–4. 
 261. Id. at 17. 
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The majority concludes that C & M Dairy (d.b.a.) is not “a 
nonexistent entity” as Fin-Ag argued but is a separate debtor that 
required a separate listing in the central filing system.  The majority 
states that 
the applicable rules for the South Dakota central filing system required 
Fin-Ag to have listed C & M Dairy [d.b.a] as a separate name on its 
EFS.  The South Dakota Administrative Rules implementing the FSA 
central filing system provide that the “use of doing business as is 
considered an additional debtor and shall be listed as such with the 
elimination of the doing business as.”262 
The court then concluded irrespective of the precise legal status of C 
& M Dairy “it was considered an additional debtor that required a 
separate listing for purpose of giving notice under the FSA.”263  Thus, the 
rule in South Dakota is that buyers have no obligation to check the public 
records other than the master list for the debtor-seller’s name.264  In some 
ways, this conclusion is form over substance, but it is a litmus paper type 
of test.  And, a buyer does not have to worry about dealing with multiple 
parties claiming a portion of the proceeds of the sale of farm products.  
The only party entitled to be a payee on the check other than a debtor is a 
party listed on the master list.265 
                                                     
 262. Id. at 11 (citing S.D. ADMIN. R. 5:04:04:20 (2009) as “discussing effect of amendment of 
financing statement to include new debtor”). 
 263. Id. 
 264. See id. 
 265. As noted in the text, this approach avoids the so-called hostage checks.  Consider the 
following example: Farmer sells farm products subject to a perfected security interest to Buyer who 
has received requests from multiple parties to be listed as a payee of the check issued for the sale of 
Farmer’s farm product.  The parties requesting to be listed include a secured creditor who has given 
Buyer proper 7 U.S.C. § 1631 notice and from others who have not complied with the notice 
provisions of § 1631.  How does Buyer proceed?  What if Buyer issues a single payee check to 
secured creditor?  What if Buyer issues a check to multiple payees, including people who have not 
complied with § 1631, and one person in this group refuses to endorse checks unless they receive a 
favorable share? 
The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) faced this problem in the past.  In October, 1992, the 
CCC attempted to deal with multiple payee checks.  It issued Notice LP-1489 to ASCS offices.  
Under this directive, buyers of grain subject to the CCC’s perfected security interest had to agree to 
issue a check payable only in the name of CCC before CCC would sign a lien waiver form.  Thus, 
the elevator was required to ignore other creditor notices under § 1631. 
The CCC would indemnify the buyers if a creditor holding a superior interest to the CCC were 
to sue the buyer.  It would only indemnify for the amount of grain specified in CCC Form CCC-681-
1 which must be signed by producer and is sent to the named buyer.  The CCC argued that as a 
standard practice county ASCS [FSA] offices conduct lien searches and obtain lien waivers from 
other filed lienholders on the quantity of commodity as collateral for price support loans before a 
price support loan is made.  Accordingly, it has priority over conflicting claims to the grain used as 
collateral for the loan.  To not permit a single payee check would essentially require the producer or 
the ASCS [FSA] office to do the same task twice, i.e. search the records and obtain lien waivers and 
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It is amazing to me that a d.b.a “entity” that is in effect a trade name 
is required to be listed on the EFS.  It appears that South Dakota is the 
only state to require this.  Section 1631 does not define the term 
“debtor.”  Under revised Article 9, a financing statement that only 
provides a trade name for the name of the debtor is legally insufficient 
and is certainly not required.266  Moreover, the brothers signed the 
security interest creating the security interest.  While not considered by 
the court, it is interesting to speculate whether the omission of the d.b.a. 
name could be considered a minor error given the factual context as to 
who physically was doing the selling.  Section 1631 does contain a minor 
error rule in the central filing notice system.  The definition of an 
“effective financing statement” for purposes of a central filing system 
under 7 U.S.C. § 1631 provides that, “The term effective financing 
statement means a statement that— . . . substantially complies with the 
requirements of this subparagraph even though it contains minor errors 
that are not seriously misleading.”267 
The majority also stated categorically that the buyer had no duty to 
investigate the legal status of C & M Dairy even though most, if not all, 
of the receiving slips given to the seller showed a Berwald had delivered 
farm products.268  The majority in effect said that because Congress was 
trying to protect buyers from having to pay twice, the statute must be 
construed with this in mind.  The dissent concluded that Cimpl knew it 
was dealing with the Berwalds fronted by C & M Dairy.269  Also the 
dissent concluded that Cimpl, the buyer, could have easily determined 
that C & M Dairy was a fictitious name.270  After all, all of the sales seem 
to have been made by Berwalds.  Yet, it is important to note that the 
definition of buyer in the ordinary course under 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(5)  
 
                                                                                                                       
subordinations from lienholders a second time.  If the ASCS search fails to discover all lienholders 
who filed before the ASCS, it will pay these lienholders.  Finally, note that if the buyer makes a 
mistake twice, the CCC’s will not permit the buyer to buy commodities subject to its perfected 
security interest for one year.  In short, CCC would comply with § 1631 and will not waive its 
interest. 
The CCC’s theory apparently was that CCC would not let the farmer participate in the loan 
program until it had obtained lien waivers from all secured creditors who had filed a UCC-1, and 
therefore it has priority as to the grain sealed and used as collateral for the loan.  This policy applied 
to buyers of grains, oilseeds, and rice subject to a perfected security interest of the CCC.  The CCC 
would indemnify the buyers if a creditor holding a superior interest to the CCC were to sue the 
buyer.  It will only indemnify for the amount of grain specified in CCC Form CCC-681-1. 
 266. U.C.C. § 9-503(c). 
 267. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(4)(H).  See also supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text. 
 268. Cimpl, 754 N.W.2d at 12. 
 269. Id. at 21 (Sabers, J., dissenting). 
 270. Id. 
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does not require good faith on the part of the buyer and knowledge is 
irrelevant.  Also, 7 U.S.C. § 1631 has no general good faith requirement. 
The other issue the court had to consider was the requirement in 7 
U.S.C. § 1631 that for a buyer of farm products to take free of a security 
interest, the seller must have created the security interest.  Section 
1631(d) provides in part: “a buyer who in the ordinary course of business 
buys a farm product from a seller engaged in farming operations shall 
take free of a security interest created by the seller . . . .”271  This issue 
had never been confronted when the debtor-seller was a d.b.a.  The 
majority rejected the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in Fin-Ag, Inc. 
v. Hufnagle, Inc.,272 that sellers fronting for the debtor could not be 
treated as sellers who had created the security interest.273  The Hufnagle 
court held that the term “seller” should mean the same for the notice 
requirement as for the requirement that the seller must have created the 
security interest.274  Thus, in Hufnagle the sellers were children or 
employees of the debtor and they were not listed on the master list, and 
therefore the buyer did not have notice.  Therefore, because they had not 
created the security interest, the seller had not created the security 
interest. 
The majority of the South Dakota Supreme Court purported to 
distinguish a fronting situation from a d.b.a situation, but really rejected 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis.  It argued that the debtors here, 
the Berwald brothers themselves did not transfer the farm products to a 
real person for later sale but utilized the d.b.a. entity to sell the cattle.275  
“Therefore, for purposes of the created by the seller limitation, Berwalds 
cannot be separated from the acts of their d.b.a. C & M Dairy.”276  
Section 1631 does not define seller and the majority looked to the UCC 
and cases dealing with UCC section 9-320’s requirement that the seller 
must have created the security interest.277  Using this background, it 
                                                     
 271. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d). 
 272. 720 N.W.2d 579 (Minn. 2006). 
 273. Cimpl, 754 N.W.2d at 13–15. 
 274. Hufnagle, 720 N.W.2d at 586–87. 
 275. Cimpl, 754 N.W.2d at 12–13.  It should be noted that the some of the cattle were sold by 
the father of the brothers.  The court does not deal with what legal relationship, if any, existed 
between the brothers and the father.  For example, was the father an employee or an agent of the 
partnership? 
 276. Id.  It must be noted that the majority rejects Hufnagle for reasons that are not very clear to 
me. It says that, unlike Hufnagle, no collusion on the part of the buyer exists.  It is unclear how the 
majority finds collusion existed in Hufnagle.  Furthermore, the majority concludes that Hufnagle 
was also premised upon an incorrect assumption dealing with the notice and the sale by an agent of 
an undisclosed principal.  The dissent rejects this. 
 277. Id. at 8.  Cf. 9 C.F.R. § 205.211 (2010) (specifically incorporating the UCC cases dealing 
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concluded that the Berwalds did business under the name C & M Dairy.  
It stated: “Legally, C & M Dairy was the Berwalds.”278  Because C & M 
Dairy was the alter ego of the Berwalds, and because the Berwalds 
created the security interest, C & M Dairy must be regarded as the seller 
who created the security interest. 
For purposes of notice to the seller, form controlled—not substance.  
For the requirement that the seller must create the security interest, by 
using the “alter ego” the majority in effect used substance over form.  
But what about the minor error rule?  The EFS was correct except the 
d.b.a. name was omitted.  How can this be seriously misleading if the 
majority treats C & M Dairy as the alter ego of the Berwalds?  For seller 
purposes, how is it possible to say that the buyer did not have notice?  It 
was simple for the majority—C & M was not listed on the EFS! 
The other South Dakota case that deserves attention is Fin-Ag, Inc. v. 
Pipestone Livestock Auction Market.279  This case, in part, involved the 
sale of cattle subject to a perfected security interest.  7 U.S.C. § 1631 
treats a commission merchant selling farm products subject to a security 
interest in the same manner as a buyer of farm products subject to a 
perfected security interest.280  Like in Cimpl, the Berwald brothers 
executed a security agreement granting Fin-Ag a security interest in farm 
products.281  A FS and EFS were filed with the Secretary of State.282  The 
FS showed the debtor as “Berwald Partnership” and described the 
collateral as all livestock and farm products.283  The EFS here, according 
to the majority, listed the debtors as Berwald Partnership, Calvin 
Berwald, Michael Berwald, Kimberly Berwald, and Sokota Dairy, LLC 
as debtors.284  The EFS covered farm products such as dairy cattle and 
milk and listed the debtor as the “Berwald Partnership.”285  The security 
agreement required joint-payee checks when any cattle were sold.286  
Most of the cattle sold through the sale barns were sold under the name 
of C & M Dairy which is the d.b.a. used by two of the Berwald brothers 
                                                                                                                       
with scope of the farm products rule under the prior version of Article 9’s definition of farm 
products under U.C.C. § 9-307).  See also supra note 186. 
 278. Cimpl, 754 N.W.2d at 16. 
 279. 754 N.W.2d 29 (S.D. 2008), cert. denied 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009). 
 280. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(g). 
 281. Pipestone Livestock, 754 N.W.2d at 34. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 34 n.2. 
 284. Id. at 34. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 35. 
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to buy and sell cattle.287  After a check of the EFS registry did not 
disclose C & M, single payee checks were issued to C & M.288  Fin-Ag 
brought a conversion action against the sale barns.289 
The majority applied the reasoning of Cimpl and held that the sale 
barn took the cattle free of Fin-Ag’s security interest even though the 
debtors used an assumed business name—it was their alter ego.290  
However, as to the sales where debtor identified himself as owner, the 
sale barn was not protected.  Debtor was listed on the EFS and the sale 
barn was required to cut a joint-payee check and it did not.291 
The court also considered whether 7 U.S.C. § 1631 protected the 
buyer when buyer retained the proceeds of a sale and set off against the 
proceeds the debtor’s antecedent debt with the seller or commission 
merchant or commission agent.292  The court held that § 1631 did not 
protect the sale barn to the extent that it applied proceeds of the cattle 
sales to debtor’s antecedent debt with the sale barns.293  Put another way, 
§ 1631 only protects the buyer in ordinary course who pays the seller the 
proceeds and is not acting like a creditor.  Thus, a buyer, who is 
protected by § 1631 as to the purchase of the farm products subject to a 
security interest, may have a problem if it sets off the amount of the 
proceeds against seller’s pre-existing debt to the buyer.  Article 9, not the 
federal rule, determines who has priority to the proceeds.  Specifically, 
the court stated: 
The application of proceeds to a preexisting debt is not protected by the 
FSA because the buyer is not acting as a “buyer in ordinary course.” 
 “Buying” does not include receiving goods or document of title 
under a preexisting contract as security “for or in total or partial 
satisfaction of a money debt,” thereby excluding “attaching creditors 
and others who take goods in satisfaction of preexisting debts” from the 
definition of “buyer in ordinary course.”294 
Now, the issue is who has priority under Article 9?  The key is what 
is the status of the parties under Article 9.  The buyer can be an 
                                                     
 287. Id. at 40. 
 288. Id. at 51 (Saber, J., dissenting). 
 289. Id. at 29. 
 290. Id. at 54 (Saber, J., dissenting). 
 291. Id. at 55 (Saber, J., dissenting). 
 292. Id. at 41. 
 293. Id. at 41. 
 294. Id. at 41 (citing Consol. Nutrition, L.C. v. IBP, Inc., 669 N.W.2d 126, 130–31 (S.D. 2003)). 
0.6.0_MEYER FINAL 5/31/2010  2:12:45 PM 
1170 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
unsecured creditor, secured creditor,295 or have an agricultural lien.296  If 
a creditor had a security interest in the farm products under UCC sections 
9-315(a)(2), the security interest continues in identifiable proceeds of the 
farm products.  Perfection of proceeds is covered in section 9-315(c)–(d) 
and the priority rules resolving conflicts between two secured creditors 
are found in section 9-322(a)–(b).  Of course, an unsecured creditor loses 
to a secured creditor.297 
The last point298 to be discussed concerning the South Dakota cases 
is that the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in June 2009.299  
After the certiorari petition was filed, the Court invited the Solicitor 
General to express the government’s view of the issue raised under 7 
U.S.C. § 1631.  In her brief, the Solicitor framed the issue as 
Whether a buyer of farm products in the ordinary course of business is 
entitled to the protections of the Food Security Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. § 
1631(d), and thus to take purchased property free of a security interest 
created by the seller, where the creditor fails to include the debtor-
seller’s “doing business as” name on its financing statement, as 
required under state law.300 
                                                     
 295. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(72)(A). 
 296. See § 9-102(a)(5).  Since 2001, Article 9 rules of perfection, priority, and default and 
enforcement apply to agricultural liens.  §§ 9-109(a)(2), -308(b), -322(a), -601 cmt. 7, -606.  The 
default rules apply to a secured party which is defined to include a holder of an agricultural lien.  See 
§ 9-102(a)(72)(B). 
Article 9 does not appear to deal with proceeds of the lien.  See § 9-302 cmt. 2, -315(a)(2).  
These articles do not refer to agricultural liens and proceeds whereas UCC section 9-315(a)(1) 
specifically refers to an agricultural lien following the sale of the collateral subject to the agricultural 
lien. 
Again, remember Kansas excluded agricultural liens from the coverage of the Kansas version of 
Article 9.  It is covered by other statutes.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-1319, 2-3007, 34-239, 
58-201, 58-203, 58-204, 58-207, 58-218, 58-220, 58-221, 58-241, 58-242, 58-2524, 58-2525, 58-
2526, 58-2527, 58-2528 (2009) (dealing with agricultural liens). 
 297. U.C.C. § 9-201(a) (2009); see § 9-317(a) (demonstrating secured creditors superior claim 
by negative inference). 
 298. Two other issues that were raised in the South Dakota cases must be noted.  One concerned 
the effectiveness of the EFS filed by creditors.  The court did not address an issue raised by the sale 
barns that the EFS was defective because it described the collateral as “dairy cattle” and some of 
cattle purchased were beef cattle.  Pipestone Livestock, 754 N.W.2d at 35; Fin-Ag, Inc. v. Cimpl’s, 
Inc., 754 N.W.2d 1, 4 (S.D. 2008).  It did recognize that 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(4)(H) contains a minor 
error provision but the analysis is complicated by the USDA regulations found in 9 C.F.R §§ 
205.106, 205.202.  See Pipestone Livestock, 754 N.W.2d at 42–43. 
The other issue involved whether the secured creditor has sufficiently shown that the sales were 
unauthorized.  A divided court held that an implied authorization to sell is not recognized as a 
defense to a state law conversion action.  Id. at 44–45. 
 299. Fin-Ag, Inc. v. Pipestone Livestock Auction Mkt., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009). 
 300. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Fin-Ag, Inc. v. Pipestone Livestock Auction 
Mkt., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009) (No. 08-576), 2009 WL 1464949, at 3. 
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The Solicitor argued in her brief that a state has the authority under 9 
C.F.R. § 205.103(b) to establish different rules for debtor’s names than 
are required under Article 9.301  The Solicitor’s brief goes on to note that 
South Dakota, according to the USDA, is the only state with a 7 U.S.C. § 
1631 central filing system that requires that a d.b.a. name be listed.302  
The Solicitor argued that this uniqueness justified the denial of 
certiorari.303 
The requirement of 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d) that the seller must have 
created the security interest remains inconsistent with the South Dakota 
decision.  The use of trade names has been rejected by the current 
version of Article 9 as being too uncertain.  UCC section 9-503(c) states 
that “[a] financing statement that provides only the debtor’s trade name 
does not sufficiently provide the name of the debtor.”304  Again, 
remember that the legal name of the debtor under Article 9 is not the 
d.b.a. name. 
The third South Dakota case, Fin-Ag, Inc. v. Watertown Livestock 
Auction, Inc.,305 decided on the same day as the two South Dakota cases 
discussed above, also involved the sale of cattle subject to a perfected 
security interest.306  The case was reversed and remanded to be handled 
in a manner consistent with the court’s determinations in Fin-Ag, Inc. v. 
Cimpl’s, Inc.307 and Fin-Ag, Inc. v. Pipestone Livestock Auction Market, 
Inc.308 
The South Dakota cases involved conversion actions filed by a 
secured creditor who asserted conversion occurred when the buyer 
purchased farm products that were subject to a perfected security interest 
and did not remit the proceeds to the secured party.309  UCC section 9-
601(a)(1) provides that upon default, a secured party “may reduce a 
claim to judgment, foreclose, or otherwise enforce the claim, security 
interest, or agricultural lien by any available judicial procedure . . . .”310  
A state conversion action is not a specified remedy in UCC section 9-
601, but it seems clear that it would be covered by the right to enforce 
the claim by “any available judicial procedure.”  Whether there is an 
                                                     
 301. Id. at 10. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. at 19. 
 304. U.C.C. § 9-503(c). 
 305. 754 N.W.2d 23 (S.D. 2008). 
 306. Id. at 23. 
 307. 754 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 2008). 
 308. 754 N.W.2d 29 (S.D. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009). 
 309. Id. at 33. 
 310. U.C.C. § 9-601(a)(1). 
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implied conversion action created by Article 9 is an interesting question.  
It is also unclear whether Article 9 creates an implied federal private 
right of action under 7 U.S.C. § 1631311 and if a federal court would have 
jurisdiction over such a claim.312 
The elements that must be established in a conversion action vary 
from state to state.  Some of the requirements for a South Dakota 
conversion action were discussed in Pipestone.313  If conversion occurs 
what are the damages which turn on the value of the collateral 
converted?  One recent decision holds that the value of the property 
converted is to be determined by the jury.314 
                                                     
 311. While 7 U.S.C. § 1631 is purely a priority rule in Article 9 terminology, it does give 
protection to buyers of farm products subject to a security interest and commission merchants selling 
farm products subject to a security interest.  This protection can probably be called a federally 
created right and provide a defense to a claim by a secured creditor for conversion.  On the other 
hand, § 1631 provides that a secured party’s state-created security interest is not cut off when 
appropriate notice is given to the buyer or commission merchant.  The statute is silent as to how a 
secured party is to enforce its security interest against the buyer.  That is, no specific remedy is set 
forth.  Thus, the question is whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action for 
damages.  The statute does provide that if the debtor sells to a buyer or a commission merchant not 
listed in the security agreement, the debtor “shall be fined $5,000 or 15 per centum of the value or 
benefit received for such farm product described in the security agreement, whichever is greater.”  7 
U.S.C. § 1631(h)(3). 
The Supreme Court has struggled with the issue of an implied federal private cause of action.  A 
landmark case is Cort v. Ash, in which the Court articulated a four-factor test for determining 
whether a private right of action is implicit in a federal statute not expressly providing for one.  422 
U.S. 66, 78 (1975).  Cort has not been overruled, but recent decisions indicate that the second factor 
requiring some concrete evidence that Congress intended to create a federal remedy is now the sole 
test.  See Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981) 
(“[t]he key to the inquiry is the intent of the Legislature”); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. 
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23–24 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979) 
(Cort factors not entitled to equal weight); Bruce A. Boyer, Howard v. Pierce: Implied Causes of 
Action and the Ongoing Vitality of Cort v. Ash, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 722, 727–28 (1985). 
 312. Cases involving 7 U.S.C. § 1631 present a federal jurisdiction issue that can arise in a 
variety of ways.  For example, the issue may present itself when the secured creditor files a 
conversion action in federal court asserting the buyer or commission merchant failed to protect the 
creditor’s right to receive the proceeds from collateral in which it had a perfected security interest of 
which buyer had notice, or when the secured party files a conversion action in a state court and the 
buyer seeks to remove the case to federal court.  While uncertainties may exist concerning federal 
court jurisdiction, it is clear that the state courts have jurisdiction, regardless of whether there is 
federal jurisdiction.  The state courts clearly have concurrent jurisdiction over issues concerning 7 
U.S.C. § 1631 because there is nothing in the statute or its legislative history indicating that 
Congress intended to make it an area that could only be litigated in the federal courts.  In other 
words, there is no indication that exclusive federal jurisdiction was intended. 
Federal jurisdiction can be predicated on (1) diversity of the parties or (2) a federal question.  28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.  Federal courts “have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Whether a suit based in part 
on 7 U.S.C. § 1631 raises a federal question turns on what “arising under the laws of the United 
States” means.  “Arising under” is not self-defining.  See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 
478 U.S. 804 (1986); Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). 
 313. Fin-Ag., Inc. v. Livestock Auction Market, Inc., 754 N.W.2d 29, 44 (S.D. 2008). 
 314. Bartlett Milling Co. v. Walnut Grove Auction and Realty Co., 665 S.E.2d 478, 485 (N.C. 
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VIII.SALE OF FARM PRODUCTS SUBJECT TO AN UNPERFECTED SECURITY 
INTEREST 
In most transactions involving the sale of farm products subject to a 
security interest, the security interest is perfected.  What law governs 
when the security interest is unperfected?  Does 7 U.S.C. § 1631 control 
or does UCC section 9-317(b) control, which deals with buyer of goods 
subject to an unperfected security interest?  UCC section 9-317(b) 
provides: “Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a buyer of . . . 
goods . . . takes free of a security interest or agricultural lien if the buyer 
gives value and receives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of 
the security interest or agricultural lien and before it is perfected.”315 
Who wins if the buyer has actual knowledge of the unperfected 
security interest before delivery but does not receive the required proper 
notice under 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d)–(e)?  Under UCC section 9-317(b), a 
buyer takes subject to the unperfected security interest because it had 
knowledge before delivery.316  The result is the opposite under the 
federal rule because a buyer takes free unless it receives the appropriate 
notice.317 
Does the federal rule preempt the UCC for all conflicts between 
buyers and secured parties whether the secured party is perfected or not?  
7 U.S.C. § 1631(d) provides: 
Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section and notwithstanding 
any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a buyer who in the 
ordinary course of business buys a farm product from a seller engaged 
in farming operations shall take free of a security interest created by the 
seller, even though the security interest is perfected; and the buyer 
knows of the existence of such interest. 
It appears that § 1631 preempts Article 9’s treatment of any 
transaction involving the sale to a buyer in ordinary course of farm 
products subject to a security interest.  This section says the rule applies 
notwithstanding state law.318  This would arguably include all of Article 
9.  If it does, Article 9 is preempted, unless this section treats unperfected 
security interests differently from perfected ones.  It appears that the 
notice requirements apply to unperfected security interests as well 
                                                                                                                       
Ct. App. 2008). 
 315. U.C.C. § 9-317(b) 
 316. Id. 
 317. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1631(d)–(e). 
 318. § 1631(d). 
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because the language simply refers to a security interest created by the 
seller.319 
IX. PURCHASERS OF FARM PRODUCTS AND AGRICULTURAL LIENS 
A. Section 1631 and Agricultural Liens Under the UCC 
Another transaction that raises a scope question about 7 U. S. C. § 
1631 concerns sales of farm products subject to a statutory lien.  Section 
1631 does not apply to involuntary liens.  Section 1631(d) simply refers 
to a security interest “created by the seller.”  An agricultural lien under 
UCC section 9-102(a)(5) is created by state statute not by agreement.  
Thus, conflicts between a holder of an agricultural lien and a purchaser 
are determined by law other than 7 U.S.C. § 1631. 
Some states, like Minnesota, have enacted § 1631-type statutes for 
agricultural liens.  Minnesota has two specific statutes dealing with the 
sale of farm products subject to a statutory lien.320  These statutes 
essentially apply the § 1631 requirements to the statutory liens.  Thus, 
the Minnesota and South Dakota cases discussed above are relevant to 
conflicts between a lien holder and a buyer of farm products subject to a 
perfected statutory lien. 
In states that do not have a Minnesota-type statute applicable to 
agricultural liens, Article 9 controls.  Section 9-315(a)(1) provides that 
an agricultural lien continues in collateral notwithstanding sale or lease 
of the collateral unless a provision in Article 9 or in UCC section 2-
403(2) provides otherwise or “the secured party authorized the 
disposition free of the . . . agricultural lien.”321 
Remember that UCC section 9-320 provides “a buyer in ordinary 
course of business, other than a person buying farm products from a 
person engaged in farming operations, takes free of a security interest 
created by the buyer’s seller, even if the security interest is perfected and 
the buyer knows of its existence.”  Agricultural liens are not mentioned 
and the definition of a security interest does not include an agricultural 
lien.322  However, UCC section 9-317(b) provides in part “a buyer . . . 
of . . . goods . . . takes free of a security interest or agricultural lien if the 
buyer gives value and receives delivery of the collateral without 
                                                     
 319. § 1631(g)(2)(A). 
 320. See MINN. STAT. §§ 336A.15 to .16 (2007). 
 321. See supra notes 136–39 and accompanying text. 
 322. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(b)(35); 9-102(a)(5); cf. § 9-102(a)(72)(B) (defining a secured party as “a 
person who holds an agricultural lien”). 
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knowledge of the security interest or agricultural lien and before it is 
perfected.”  The negative inference is that, if an agricultural lien holder 
has perfected its lien, the buyer takes subject to it.  Thus, combining 
UCC section 9-317(b) with section 9-315(a)(1), the agricultural lien is 
not cut off by a sale to a buyer in the ordinary course. 
B. Kansas’s Approach to Sale of Farm Products Subject to a Statutory 
Lien 
One of the most significant 2001 revisions of Article 9 involved 
nonpossessory liens in agricultural products.  For the first time, a 
nonpossessory statutory lien defined as an “agriculture lien” was made 
subject to the uniform version of Article 9’s perfection, priority, and 
enforcement rules.  Every state except Kansas included this coverage 
when the UCC was enacted.  The Kansas Legislature excluded from the 
coverage of Article 9 nonpossessory agricultural liens in farm products 
created by the statutory liens listed in K.S.A. sections 84-9-102(a)(76) & 
9-102(a)(5).  Also see K.S.A. section 84-9-201(b) which purports to say 
that Article 9 is subject to state statutes that create a different rule 
“including, but not limited to, K.S.A. section 2-1319, 2-2608, 2-3007, 
34-239, 47-836, 58-201, 58-203, 58-204, 58-207, 58-218, 58-220, 58-
221, 58-241, 58-242, 58-2524, 58-2525, 58-2526, 58-2527, 58-2528, and 
84-7-209.”323 
Kansas has no general statute dealing with the sale of farm products 
subject to a statutory lien.  Kansas does have a statute dealing with 
landlord liens and purchasers from tenants who have not paid the rent.  
Kansas statutes dealing with landlord liens have not been amended since 
1923 and provide: 
Kan. Stat. Ann. §58-2524.  Rent as lien on crop.  Any rent due for 
farming land shall be a lien on the crop growing or made on the 
premises.  Such lien may be enforced by action and attachment therein, 
as hereinafter provided.324 
                                                     
 323. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-201(b).  Creditors thinking about or taking a security interest in 
farm products in Kansas have a potpourri of statutory liens that have no uniformity as to creation, 
perfection, priority, and enforcement. This uncertainty also applies to the purchasers of farm 
products. 
In Kansas, each statute creating an agriculture lien and cases interpreting it must be checked to 
determine how it is created, when it attaches, when it is perfected, when it has priority over other 
creditors or buyers and how the lien is enforced.  A number of law review articles examine 
agricultural financing and liens under revised Article 9.  See, e.g., Meyer, Unique Treatment, supra 
note 13 and articles cited therein. 
 324. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2524. 
0.6.0_MEYER FINAL 5/31/2010  2:12:45 PM 
1176 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
Kan. Stat. Ann. §58-2525.  Same; lessor’s remedies when rent payable 
in share of crop.  When any such rent is payable in a share or certain 
proportion of the crop, the lessor shall be deemed the owner of such 
share or proportion, and may, if the tenant refuses to deliver the lessor 
such share or proportion, enter upon the land and take possession of the 
same, or obtain possession thereof by action of replevin. 325 
Kan. Stat. Ann. §58-2526.  Recovery of rent from purchaser of crop.  
The person entitled to the rent may recover from the purchaser of the 
crop, or any part thereof, with notice of the lien the value of the crop 
purchased, to the extent of the rent due and damages.326 
Issues concerning the sale of farm products produced on rented land 
can arise in at least two distinct situations.  One situation arises when the 
land is cash rented.  A conflict arises here when the tenant does not pay 
the rent and sells the crop produced on the rented land to a local elevator.  
Under K.S.A. section 58-2524, the landowner has a lien on the crops and 
may recover the cash rent owed from the elevator.  Also, K.S.A. section 
58-2526 allows the unpaid landowner to collect from the purchaser with 
notice of the lien.  To be successful, the landowner must show the rent 
was unpaid, the crops were produced on the rented land, and the 
purchaser had notice of the lien.  The landlord has the burden of 
establishing that the purchaser had notice.327  Unlike in the UCC, no 
statutory definition of notice exists.  Thus, courts have to determine if 
something less than actual knowledge will suffice.  The old cases seem 
to indicate that constructive notice is possible.328  Courts might analogize 
to the UCC’s definition of notice.329 
A second situation arises with a crop-share lease.  The tenant sells all 
of the crops without the consent of the landowner.  Here it would appear 
that landowner does not have to use K.S.A. section 58-2526.  K.S.A. 
section 58-2525 seems to say that under a crop-share lease, the 
landowner is deemed to be the owner of the portion of crops treated as 
rent.  For example, if the crop-share lease is one-third to landowner and 
two-thirds to tenant, the land owner is deemed to be the owner of one-
third of the crop produced on the rented land.  No mention is made of a 
purchaser of the landowner’s crop-share.  The only remedy discussed is 
that the land owner is authorized to enter upon the land and seize its 
                                                     
 325. § 58-2525. 
 326. § 58-2526. 
 327. See Hayhurst v. Saile, 288 P. 539 (Kan. 1930); Hayhurst v. Underwood, 267 P. 965 (Kan. 
1928); Maelzer v. Swan, 89 P. 1037 (Kan. 1907). 
 328. Id. 
 329. See U.C.C. § 1-202. 
0.6.0_MEYER FINAL 5/31/2010  2:12:45 PM 
2010] A GARDEN VARIETY OF UCC ISSUES 1177 
share of the crop; it does not discuss a remedy against a purchaser.  
When the tenant sells all of the crops produced on the rented land, part of 
those crops belonged to the landowner.  The tenant was not authorized to 
sell them.  The tenant has in effect stolen the crops belonging to 
landowner.  The general rule is that a thief has no title or void title and 
the purchaser gets only the title that the seller had or had the power to 
transfer.330  Thus, absent some estoppel argument or maybe an 
entrustment argument under UCC section 2-403(2), the purchaser will 
lose to landowner.331  The issues dealing with leases could be avoided 
very easily when a cash lease is involved.  Landowner simply gets the 
cash at the beginning of the lease. 
                                                     
 330. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403(1). 
 331. See supra notes 138–83 and accompanying text. 
